The post QueryNet: An Efficient Attack Framework with Surrogates Carrying Multiple Identities appeared first on Malware Devil.
The post Securing IoT Devices by Exploiting Backscatter Propagation Signatures appeared first on Malware Devil.
The post Gradient-based Data Subversion Attack Against Binary Classifiers appeared first on Malware Devil.
The post SHELBRS: Location Based Recommendation Services using Switchable Homomorphic Encryption appeared first on Malware Devil.
The post A Measurement Study on the (In)security of End-of-Life (EoL) Embedded Devices appeared first on Malware Devil.
Continuing on from the “Quick and dirty Python: masscan” diary, which implemented a simple port scanner in Python using masscan to detect web instances on TCP ports 80 or 443. Masscan is perfectly good as a blunt instrument to quickly find open TCP ports across large address spaces, but for fine details it is better to use a scanner like nmap that, while much slower, is able to probe the port to get a better idea of what is running.
First lets backtrack. Since the previous diary, I converted the masscan code to a function and created another function to parse the masscan results to return the list of IPs on which masscan detected open ports. The current script scan_web.py script is:
#!/usr/local/bin/python3
import sys,getopt,argparse
import masscan
import pprint
def scan_masscan(ips):
try:
maso = masscan.PortScanner()
maso.scan(ips, ports=’80,443′)
except:
print(“Error:”, sys.exc_info()[0])
sys.exit(1)
return(maso)
def parse_masscan_host_list(massout):
#initialize
host_list = list()
# Build a list from the massscan output
for host in massout.all_hosts:
host_list.append(host)
return(host_list)
def main():
# read in the IP parameter
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument(‘IP’, help=”IP address or range”)
args=parser.parse_args()
ip=args.IP
maso=scan_masscan(ip)
if int(maso.scanstats[‘uphosts’]) > 0:
host_list=parse_masscan_host_list(maso)
pprint.pprint(host_list)
else:
print(“No Masscan results”)
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == “__main__”:
main()
Running the script results in a list of IPs where either 80 or 443 were detected open by masscan.
# ./scan_web.py 45.60.103.0,45.60.31.34,1.2.3.4
[2021-05-31 18:28:51,335] [DEBUG] [masscan.py 10 line] Scan parameters: “masscan -oX – 45.60.103.0,45.60.31.34,1.2.3.4 -p 80,443”
[‘45.60.103.0’, ‘45.60.31.34’]
Extending this script to pass the masscan output list to nmap is relatively easy as well. As somebody pointed out on a comment to the last diary, there are a lot of Python nmap modules and they all provide differing functionality. After messing with a few of them, as the comment stated, the libnmap module appears to be the most functional and easiest to use. libnmap does not implement nmap functionality, it needs nmap already installed on the device and interfaces with that version. I will not be going over nmap functionality in this diary. If you are not clear on the nmap command parameters you can find a quick tutorial in this older diary.
To implement the nmap scan will require two functions. One to run the scan, and one to parse the results.
The scanning function:
def scan_nmap(ip_list):
print(“Starting nmap for: {0}”.format(ip_list))
nm = NmapProcess(ip_list, options=”-Pn -n -A -sT -p80,443 -r –max-retries 2 –host-timeout 2h –open –reason”)
nrc = nm.run()
if nrc != 0:
print(“nmap scan failed: {0}”.format(nm.stderr))
exit(0)
try:
nparse = NmapParser.parse(nm.stdout)
except NmapParserExcetion as e:
print(“Exception raised while parsing scan: {0}”.format(e.msg))
return(nparse)
and the function to parse and output the scan result. This example is almost verbatim from the libnmap documentation.
def print_nmap(nmap_report):
print(“Starting Nmap {0} ( http://nmap.org ) at {1}”.format(
nmap_report.version,
nmap_report.started))
for host in nmap_report.hosts:
if len(host.hostnames):
tmp_host = host.hostnames.pop()
else:
tmp_host = host.address
print(“Nmap scan report for {0} ({1})”.format(
tmp_host,
host.address))
print(“Host is {0}.”.format(host.status))
print(” PORT STATE SERVICE”)
for serv in host.services:
pserv = “{0:>5s}/{1:3s} {2:12s} {3}”.format(
str(serv.port),
serv.protocol,
serv.state,
serv.service)
if len(serv.banner):
pserv += ” ({0})”.format(serv.banner)
print(pserv)
print(nmap_report.summary)
The output from the finished script is:
# ./scan_web.py 45.60.103.0,45.60.31.34,1.2.3.4
[2021-05-31 19:00:56,329] [DEBUG] [masscan.py 10 line] Scan parameters: “masscan -oX – 45.60.103.0,45.60.31.34,1.2.3.4 -p 80,443”
Starting nmap for: [‘45.60.103.0’, ‘45.60.31.34’]
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( http://nmap.org ) at 1622487670
Nmap scan report for 45.60.103.0 (45.60.103.0)
Host is up.
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap scan report for 45.60.31.34 (45.60.31.34)
Host is up.
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done at Mon May 31 19:01:49 2021; 2 IP addresses (2 hosts up) scanned in 40.03 seconds
In about 80 lines of python code. I have implemented a simple script that can quickly scan a large address space using the very quick masscan and then send the output to nmap to do detailed scanning of a single port. This script is the basic framework I use for dozens of scripts to scan an entire ASN looking for devices that may be at risk for the current vulnerability of the week.
The final version of the scan_web.py script is:
#!/usr/local/bin/python3
import sys,getopt,argparse
import masscan
from libnmap.process import NmapProcess
from libnmap.parser import NmapParser, NmapParserException
import pprint
def scan_masscan(ips):
try:
maso = masscan.PortScanner()
maso.scan(ips, ports=’80,443′)
except:
print(“Error:”, sys.exc_info()[0])
sys.exit(1)
return(maso)
def parse_masscan_host_list(massout):
#initialize
host_list = list()
# Build a list from the massscan output
for host in massout.all_hosts:
host_list.append(host)
return(host_list)
def scan_nmap(ip_list):
print(“Starting nmap for: {0}”.format(ip_list))
nm = NmapProcess(ip_list, options=”-Pn -n -A -sT -p80,443 -r –max-retries 2 –host-timeout 2h –open –reason”)
nrc = nm.run()
if nrc != 0:
print(“nmap scan failed: {0}”.format(nm.stderr))
exit(0)
try:
nparse = NmapParser.parse(nm.stdout)
except NmapParserExcetion as e:
print(“Exception raised while parsing scan: {0}”.format(e.msg))
pprint.pprint(nparse)
return(nparse)
def print_nmap(nmap_report):
print(“Starting Nmap {0} ( http://nmap.org ) at {1}”.format(
nmap_report.version,
nmap_report.started))
for host in nmap_report.hosts:
if len(host.hostnames):
tmp_host = host.hostnames.pop()
else:
tmp_host = host.address
print(“Nmap scan report for {0} ({1})”.format(
tmp_host,
host.address))
print(“Host is {0}.”.format(host.status))
print(” PORT STATE SERVICE”)
for serv in host.services:
pserv = “{0:>5s}/{1:3s} {2:12s} {3}”.format(
str(serv.port),
serv.protocol,
serv.state,
serv.service)
if len(serv.banner):
pserv += ” ({0})”.format(serv.banner)
print(pserv)
print(nmap_report.summary)
def main():
# read in the IP parameter
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument(‘IP’, help=”IP address or range”)
args=parser.parse_args()
ip=args.IP
maso=scan_masscan(ip)
if int(maso.scanstats[‘uphosts’]) > 0:
host_list=parse_masscan_host_list(maso)
nreport = scan_nmap(host_list)
print_nmap(nreport)
else:
print(“No Masscan results”)
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == “__main__”:
main()
Caveat1: Never scan an IP range you don’t have permission to scan. While port scanning is not illegal in most jurisdictions it is questionable ethically to scan things you don’t own or have permission to scan.
Caveat2: I am not a professional Python programmer. My scripting gets the job done that I need it to do. I know there are many smart people out there who can write way better code than I can.
— Rick Wanner MSISE – rwanner at isc dot sans dot edu – Twitter:namedeplume (Protected)
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Read More
The post Quick and dirty Python: nmap, (Mon, May 31st) appeared first on Malware Devil.
Starting June 8, Amazon will automatically enable a feature on its family of hardware devices, including Echo speakers, Ring Video Doorbells, Ring Floodlight Cams, and Ring Spotlight Cams, that will share a small part of your Internet bandwidth with nearby neighbors — unless you choose to opt-out.
To that effect, the company intends to register all compatible devices that are operational in the U.S. into an ambitious location-tracking system called Sidewalk as it prepares to roll out the shared mesh network in the country.
Originally announced in September 2019, Sidewalk is part of Amazon’s efforts to build a long-range wireless network that leverages a combination of Bluetooth and 900 MHz spectrum (FSK) to help Echo, Ring, Tile trackers, and other Sidewalk-enabled devices communicate over the internet without Wi-Fi.
Sidewalk is designed to extend the working range of low-bandwidth devices, and help devices stay connected even if they are outside the range of a user’s home Wi-Fi network. It achieves this by pooling together a small sliver of internet bandwidth from the participating devices to create what’s a shared network.
The mechanism that undergirds Sidewalk is conceptually analogous to how Apple leverages its huge installed base of Apple devices to help locate lost devices using its Find My network. But Sidewalk also extends beyond location tracking for virtually any kind of short-range two-way communication. Besides utilizing Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Sidewalk also makes use of long-range wireless technology known as LoRa to help devices stay connected and continue to work over longer distances.
By flipping the switch on Sidewalk in the U.S. for all capable devices by default, the idea is to co-opt millions of smart home devices into the network and provide near-ubiquitous connectivity out of the range of a standard Wi-Fi network.
Elaborating on the protections baked into Sidewalk, the retail and entertainment behemoth said that packets traversing through the network are secured by three layers of encryption, and that it has safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized devices from joining by using Sidewalk credentials created during device registration process to authenticate their identities.
“Sidewalk protects customer privacy by limiting the amount and type of metadata that Amazon needs to receive from Sidewalk endpoints to manage the network,” the company said in a white paper, while stressing that Sidewalk has been implemented with security protocols to prevent disclosure of private information and any commands that may be transmitted over the network.
Each transmission between an endpoint (say, leak sensors, door locks, or smart lights) and its respective application server is also identified by a unique transmission-ID (TX-ID) that changes every 15 minutes to prevent tracking devices and associating a device to a specific user.
That said, Sidewalk does need to know a third-party Sidewalk-enabled device’s serial number to route the message to its respective application server. “The routing information that Amazon does receive for operating the network components of Sidewalk is automatically cleared every 24 hours,” it added. Amazon also noted in the whitepaper that endpoints reported as lost or stolen will blocklisted.
While the security guarantees of the undertaking are without a doubt a step in the right direction, it’s been established repeatedly that wireless technologies like Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are prone to critical flaws that leave devices vulnerable to a variety of attacks, and a proprietary communication protocol like Sidewalk could be no exception. This is setting aside the possibility that the technology could be abused as surveillance tools to discreetly track a partner and encourage stalking.
A matter of more concern is that Sidewalk is opt-out rather than opt-in, meaning users will be automatically enrolled into Sidewalk unless they choose to explicitly turn it off.
In an FAQ on the Sidewalk page, Amazon says that should users opt to disable the feature, it’s tantamount to “missing out on Sidewalk’s connectivity and location related benefits,” adding “You also will no longer contribute your internet bandwidth to support community extended coverage benefits such as locating pets and valuables with Sidewalk-enabled devices.”
Owners of Echo and Ring devices can elect to opt-out of the device-to-device network either via Alex or Ring apps by following the below steps:
Alexa app: Open More > select Settings > Account Settings > Amazon Sidewalk, and toggle it on/off
Ring app: Tap “three-lined” menu > Control Center > Sidewalk, and tap the slider button
Found this article interesting? Follow THN on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.
The post Your Amazon Devices to Automatically Share Your Wi-Fi With Neighbors appeared first on Malware Devil.
Photograph Courtesy of the United States Marine Corps, Photographer: Caitlin Brink, CPL, USMC
The post United States Memorial Day 2021 appeared first on Security Boulevard.
The post United States Memorial Day 2021 appeared first on Malware Devil.
Microsoft on Thursday disclosed that the threat actor behind the SolarWinds supply chain hack returned to the threat landscape to target government agencies, think tanks, consultants, and non-governmental organizations located across 24 countries, including the U.S.
Some of the entities that were singled out include the U.S. Atlantic Council, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Ukrainian Anti-Corruption Action Center (ANTAC), the EU DisinfoLab, and the Government of Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs.
“This wave of attacks targeted approximately 3,000 email accounts at more than 150 different organizations,” Tom Burt, Microsoft’s Corporate Vice President for Customer Security and Trust, said. “At least a quarter of the targeted organizations were involved in international development, humanitarian, and human rights work.”
Microsoft attributed the ongoing intrusions to the Russian threat actor it tracks as Nobelium, and by the wider cybersecurity community under the monikers APT29, UNC2452 (FireEye), SolarStorm (Unit 42), StellarParticle (Crowdstrike), Dark Halo (Volexity), and Iron Ritual (Secureworks).
The latest wave in a series of intrusions is said to have begun on Jan. 28, 2021, before reaching a new level of escalation on May 25. The attacks leveraged a legitimate mass-mailing service called Constant Contact to conceal its malicious activity and masquerade as USAID, a U.S.-based development organization, for a wide-scale phishing campaign that distributed phishing emails to a variety of organizations and industry verticals.
“Nobelium launched this week’s attacks by gaining access to the Constant Contact account of USAID,” Burt said.
These seemingly authentic emails included a link that, when clicked, delivered a malicious optical disc image file (“ICA-declass.iso”) to inject a custom Cobalt Strike Beacon implant dubbed NativeZone (“Documents.dll”). The backdoor, as observed in previous incidents, comes equipped with capabilities to maintain persistent access, conduct lateral movement, exfiltrate data, and install additional malware.
In another variation of the targeted attacks detected before April, Nobelium experimented with profiling the target machine after the email recipient clicked the link. In the event the underlying operating system turned out to be iOS, the victim was redirected to a second remote server to dispatch an exploit for the then zero-day CVE-2021-1879. Apple addressed the flaw on March 26, acknowledging that “this issue may have been actively exploited.”
Cybersecurity firms Secureworks and Volexity, which corroborated the findings, said the campaign singled out non-governmental organizations, research institutions, government entities, and international agencies situated in the U.S., Ukraine, and the European Union.
“The very narrow and specific set of email identifiers and organizations observed by CTU researchers strongly indicate that the campaign is focused on U.S. and European diplomatic and policy missions that would be of interest to foreign intelligence services,” researchers from Secureworks Counter Threat Unit noted.
The latest attacks add to evidence of the threat actor’s recurring pattern of using unique infrastructure and tooling for each target, thereby giving the attackers a high level of stealth and enabling them to remain undetected for extended periods of time.
The ever-evolving nature of Nobelium’s tradecraft is also likely to be a direct response to the highly publicized SolarWinds incident, suggesting the attackers could further continue to experiment with their methods to meet their objectives.
“When coupled with the attack on SolarWinds, it’s clear that part of Nobelium’s playbook is to gain access to trusted technology providers and infect their customers,” Burt said. “By piggybacking on software updates and now mass email providers, Nobelium increases the chances of collateral damage in espionage operations and undermines trust in the technology ecosystem.”
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The post SolarWinds Hackers Target Think Tanks With New ‘NativeZone’ Backdoor appeared first on Malware Devil.
Siemens on Friday shipped firmed updates to address a severe vulnerability in SIMATIC S7-1200 and S7-1500 programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that could be exploited by a malicious actor to remotely gain access to protected areas of the memory and achieve unrestricted and undetected code execution, in what the researchers describe as an attacker’s “holy grail.”
The memory protection bypass
Read More
The post A New Bug in Siemens PLCs Could Let Hackers Run Malicious Code Remotely appeared first on Malware Devil.
A new article in Dark Reading discusses the “4 Ways CISOs Can Strengthen Their Security Resilience.” The article caught my attention because one of the 4 areas was to “Secure Workloads and Kubernetes Environments.” I was surprised by the inclusion of this requirement not because it isn’t important, but because it wasn’t just considered a given in every organization today.
The post 4 Ways CISOs Can Strengthen Their Security Resilience appeared first on K2io.
The post 4 Ways CISOs Can Strengthen Their Security Resilience appeared first on Security Boulevard.
The post 4 Ways CISOs Can Strengthen Their Security Resilience appeared first on Malware Devil.
The critical infrastructure of the United States includes all those systems and assets that are essential to the proper functioning, economy, health, and safety of American society. The roads and railways that we travel on; the Internet and the mobile networks that connect us; the water that we drink; the healthcare, financial services and security […]… Read More
The post U.S. Critical Infrastructure: Addressing Cyber Threats and the Importance of Prevention appeared first on The State of Security.
The post U.S. Critical Infrastructure: Addressing Cyber Threats and the Importance of Prevention appeared first on Security Boulevard.
The post U.S. Critical Infrastructure: Addressing Cyber Threats and the Importance of Prevention appeared first on Malware Devil.
Anthony Israel-Davis joins the show to discuss what you can do with the DBIR as a practitioner and his perspective on the proposed Cybersecurity Safety Review Board. Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5UDKiGLlzxhiGnd6FtvEnmStitcher: https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-tripwire-cybersecurity-podcastRSS: https://tripwire.libsyn.com/rssYouTube: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLgTfY3TXF9YKE9pUKp57pGSTaapTLpvC3 Tim Erlin: Welcome everyone to the Tripwire Cybersecurity Podcast. I am Tim Erlin, vice president of product management at Tripwire. I am joined […]… Read More
The post Where Should I Spend My Time? Looking at Verizon DBIR & Executive Order appeared first on The State of Security.
The post Where Should I Spend My Time? Looking at Verizon DBIR & Executive Order appeared first on Security Boulevard.
The post Where Should I Spend My Time? Looking at Verizon DBIR & Executive Order appeared first on Malware Devil.
Dear blog readers,
I’ve decided to continue the “Exposing Protonmail and Tutanota’s Illicit Abuse by Ransomware Gangs – A Compilation of Currently Active Ransomware-Themed Email Addresses” blog post series and offer an in-depth tactical and actionable threat intelligence on some of the currently active Protonmail and Tutanota email accounts known to have been involved in currently active ransomware campaigns.
A list of currently active Protonmail email address accounts known to have been involved in currently active ransomare campaigns:
saturndayc@protonmail.com
mammon0503@protonmail.com
GoNNaCrypt@protonmail.com
helpteam38@protonmail.com
mstr.hack@protonmail.com
hccapx@protonmail.com
erica2020@protonmail.com
werichbin@protonmail.com
getscoin3@protonmail.com
bugbugo@protonmail.com
newhelper24@protonmail.ch
recoverydata52@protonmail.com
metasload2021@protonmail.com
encryptor2020@protonmail.com
rans0me@protonmail.com
fiasco911@protonmail.com
metron28@protonmail.com
Bit_decrypt@protonmail.com
databack2@protonmail.com
SafeGman@protonmail.com
decrypt25@protonmail.com
n0pr0blems@protonmail.com
decryptfilekhoda@protonmail.com
SmartDen@protonmail.com
getdataback22@protonmail.com
geniusid@protonmail.ch
cryptonationusa@protonmail.com
cynthia-it@protonmail.com
aihlp@protonmail.com
ambrosiaa@protonmail.com
gangflsbang@protonmail.ch
usernamus@protonmail.com
basilisque@protonmail.com
mailnitrom@protonmail.ch
araujosantos@protonmail.com
paymebtc@protonmail.com
logiteam@protonmail.com
recovery_server@protonmail.com
china_jm@protonmail.ch
FushenKingdee@protonmail.com
imperial755@protonmail.com
geneve010@protonmail.com
geneve020@protonmail.com
ngeneve010@protonmail.com
ngeneve020@protonmail.com
grupposupp@protonmail.ch
ripntfs@protonmail.com
unlockmeADMIN@protonmail.com
ArtemisDC@protonmail.ch
leakthemall@protonmail.com
nleakthemall@protonmail.com
middleman2020@protonmail.com
nmiddleman2020@protonmail.com
moloch_helpdesk@protonmail.ch
mr.dec@protonmail.com
ZiCoyote@protonmail.com
recover_24_7@protonmail.com
nrecover_24_7@protonmail.com
ransomD3m@protonmail.com
newhelper@protonmail.ch
zemblax@protonmail.com
2rest0re@protonmail.com
n2rest0re@protonmail.com
Cryptoware12@protonmail.com
RestoreFile@protonmail.com
nRestoreFile@protonmail.com
TimothyCrabtree@protonmail.com
filedownload2020@protonmail.com
helpcov19@protonmail.com
black8201@protonmail.com
kjingx@protonmail.ch
gibberishEdmundBass@protonmail.com
recoverydata54@protonmail.com
mewellwisher@protonmail.ch
CCD-help@protonmail.ch
rdpconnect@protonmail.com
ReftuOne@protonmail.com
hupstore@protonmail.com
bepabepababy1@protonmail.com
myphoto.jpg.bepabepababy1@protonmail.com
BlackMajor@protonmail.com
zetfile@protonmail.ch
admincrypt@protonmail.com
nrecovery_server@protonmail.com
use_harrd@protonmail.com
un42@protonmail.com
Servicedeskpay@protonmail.com
yoursalvations@protonmail.ch
y0000@protonmail.com
supportcrypt2019@protonmail.com
0xc030@protonmail.ch
backuping@protonmail.com
0x1service@protonmail.com
document.txt.bepabepababy1@protonmail.com
Blitzkriegpc@protonmail.com
CyberSCCP@protonmail.com
dogeremembersss@protonmail.ch
mykeyhelp@protonmail.com
Zagrec@protonmail.com
jackgreen13@protonmail.com
jacksparrow@protonmail.com
my-contact-email@protonmail.com
alanson_street8@protonmail.com
lambchristoffer@protonmail.com
moncoin@protonmail.com
Unlckr@protonmail.com
castor-troy-restore@protonmail.com
unlockransomware@protonmail.com
52pojie_mail@protonmail.com
support981723721@protonmail.com
solutionshelp@protonmail.com
gluttonBD@protonmail.com
sigrun_decryptor@protonmail.ch
reservedecryption@protonmail.com
recoverydbservice@protonmail.com
wecanhelp2@protonmail.com
yoursalvationsa@protonmail.ch
dalailama2015@protonmail.ch
decrypthelpfiles@protonmail.com
5btc@protonmail.com
Anony.killers@protonmail.com
provectus@protonmail.com
Look1213@protonmail.com
mrbin775@protonmail.com
AskHelp@protonmail.com
Restore@protonmail.ch
Santa_helper@protonmail.com
Recuperadados@protonmail.com
cryz1@protonmail.com
petersburgrecover@protonmail.com
Recoverhelp@protonmail.ch
painplain98@protonmail.com
hpjar@protonmail.ch
ballxball@protonmail.com
crioso@protonmail.com
angry_war@protonmail.ch
cheet0s_de@protonmail.com
Pringls_us@protonmail.com
backinfo@protonmail.com
agent.dmr@protonmail.com
getscoin2@protonmail.com
hlpp@protonmail.ch
lxhlp@protonmail.com
onepconebtc@protonmail.com
recoverysql@protonmail.com
anna.kurtz@protonmail.com
x_coded@protonmail.com
niggchiphoterl974@protonmail.com
teamvi@protonmail.com
teamvv@protonmail.com
mr.crypteur@protonmail.com
help.me24@protonmail.com
support_blackkingdom2@protonmail.com
backcompanyfiles@protonmail.com
bhatmaker@protonmail.com
polssh1@protonmail.com
polssh@protonmail.com
coincidenceleague@protonmail.com
Prometheus.help@protonmail.ch
nPrometheus.help@protonmail.ch
btpsupport@protonmail.com
GeorjeHalique@protonmail.com
cottleakela@protonmail.com
villiamsscorj_rembly@protonmail.com
flopored@protonmail.com
hjelp.main@protonmail.com
Savemyfiles@protonmail.com
Lucky_top@protonmail.com
rsupport@protonmail.ch
rsupp@protonmail.ch
se_harrd@protonmail.com
crab1917@protonmail.com
6699nm@protonmail.com
decryptxxx@protonmail.com
grafimatriux72224733@protonmail.com
Catsexy@protonmail.com
A list of currently active Tutanota email address accounts known to have been involved in currently active ransomare campaigns:
yasomoto@tutanota.com
seamoon@tutanota.com
xsmaxs@tutanota.com
mammon0503@tutanota.com
samsung00700@tutanota.com
RestorFile@tutanota.com
notgoodnews@tutanota.com
hlper4y@tutanota.com
moloch_helpdesk@tutanota.com
vassago_0203@tutanota.com
pvphlp@tutanota.com
adolfhackler@tutanota.com
decryfiles2021@tutanota.com
axitrun2@tutanota.com
barboza40@tutanota.com
nbarboza40@tutanota.com
mailnitrom@tutanota.com
ha7medtit@tutanota.com
dashagh@tutanota.com
Citrteam@tutanota.com
nCitrteam@tutanota.com
nekross@tutanota.com
nnekross@tutanota.com
Swordf1sh@tutanota.com
recover10@tutanota.com
tcprx@tutanota.com
middleman2020@tutanota.com
nmiddleman2020@tutanota.com
Hiden_pro@tutanota.com
mr.dec@tutanota.com
retrnyoufiles23@tutanota.com
nretrnyoufiles23@tutanota.com
pecunia0318@tutanota.com
clyde.barrow15@tutanota.com
nRestorFile@tutanota.com
HappyNewYear2021@tutanota.com
vassago0225@tutanota.com
iamwellwisher@tutanota.com
yourfiles1@tutanota.de
kamira99@tutanota.com
host2021@tutanota.com
legalrestore@tutanota.com
fishersam1188@tutanota.com
price.decoding@tutanota.com
Blacknord@tutanota.com
krasume@tutanota.com
yuzhou13@tutanota.com
patrik008@tutanota.com
Files2021@tutanota.com
adren.kutospov.97@tutanota.com
donutmmm@tutanota.com
bcpfile17@tutanota.com
bitrequest@tutanota.com
konxnobx@tutanota.com
triplock@tutanota.com
ths1337@tutanota.com
rsa1024@tutanota.com
rememberggg@tutanota.com
skynet45@tutanota.com
Starbax@tutanota.com
Xzet@tutanota.com
mr.hacker@tutanota.com
Patagonia92@tutanota.com
powerbase@tutanota.com
mirey@tutanota.com
sabantui@tutanota.com
qar48@tutanota.com
yyuzhou13@tutanota.com
nmode@tutanota.com
Sacura889@tutanota.com
savemyself1@tutanota.com
yongloun@tutanota.com
dozusopo@tutanota.com
tchukopchu@tutanota.com
dokulus@tutanota.com
pashmak@tutanota.com
blackmax@tutanota.com
lizscudata@tutanota.com
clifieb@tutanota.com
dryidik@tutanota.com
ammon0503@tutanota.com
judgemebackup@tutanota.com
yourfiles1@tutanota.com
ARASUF@tutanota.com
ykup@tutanota.com
bhatmaker@tutanota.com
buratino2@tutanota.com
ticketbit@tutanota.com
Stay tuned!
The post Exposing Protonmail and Tutanota’s Illicit Abuse by Ransomware Gangs – A Compilation of Currently Active Ransomware-Themed Email Addresses – Part Two appeared first on Security Boulevard.
The post Exposing Protonmail and Tutanota’s Illicit Abuse by Ransomware Gangs – A Compilation of Currently Active Ransomware-Themed Email Addresses – Part Two appeared first on Malware Devil.
CybeReady’s Hi-5 brings together InfoSec leaders for peer-to-peer sharing via five short questions and insights. Mário João Fernandes, born and raised in Mozambique, has been working in the banking sector for 29 years and has been fulfilling dedicated security roles in the cybersecurity space for over 11 years. After serving as a navy officer and […]
The post Hi-5 With A CISO <br><br> Mário Fernandes, Banco BPI appeared first on CybeReady.
The post Hi-5 With A CISO Mário Fernandes, Banco BPI appeared first on Security Boulevard.
The post Hi-5 With A CISO Mário Fernandes, Banco BPI appeared first on Malware Devil.
Have you considered a career in cybersecurity? It is a fast-paced, highly dynamic field with a huge number of specialties to choose from, including forensics, endpoint security, critical infrastructure, incident response, secure coding, and awareness and training. In addition, a career in cybersecurity allows you to work almost anywhere in the world, with amazing benefits and an opportunity to make a real difference. However, the most exciting thing is you do NOT need a technical background, anyone can get started.
Read More
The post Careers in Cybersecurity appeared first on Malware Devil.
—–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA256
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2021.1849
libxml2 security update
31 May 2021
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
———————————
Product: libxml2
Publisher: Debian
Operating System: Debian GNU/Linux
Linux variants
Impact/Access: Denial of Service — Existing Account
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2021-3541
Original Bulletin:
https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/05/msg00024.html
Comment: This advisory references vulnerabilities in products which run on
platforms other than Debian. It is recommended that administrators
running libxml2 check for an updated version of the software for
their operating system.
– ————————–BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT——————–
– —–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA512
– – ————————————————————————-
Debian LTS Advisory DLA-2669-1 debian-lts@lists.debian.org
https://www.debian.org/lts/security/ Thorsten Alteholz
May 30, 2021 https://wiki.debian.org/LTS
– – ————————————————————————-
Package : libxml2
Version : 2.9.4+dfsg1-2.2+deb9u5
CVE ID : CVE-2021-3541
An issue has been found in libxml2, the GNOME XML library.
This issue is called “Parameter Laughs”-attack and is related to parameter
entities expansion.
It is similar to the “Billion Laughs”-attacks found earlier in libexpat.
More information can be found at [1]
[1] https://blog.hartwork.org/posts/cve-2021-3541-parameter-laughs-fixed-in-libxml2-2-9-11/
For Debian 9 stretch, this problem has been fixed in version
2.9.4+dfsg1-2.2+deb9u5.
We recommend that you upgrade your libxml2 packages.
For the detailed security status of libxml2 please refer to
its security tracker page at:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/libxml2
Further information about Debian LTS security advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://wiki.debian.org/LTS
– —–BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE—–
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– —–END PGP SIGNATURE—–
– ————————–END INCLUDED TEXT——————–
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation’s
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT’s members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation’s
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author’s website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
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The post ESB-2021.1849 – [Linux][Debian] libxml2: Denial of service – Existing account appeared first on Malware Devil.
—–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA256
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2021.1850
nginx security update
31 May 2021
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
———————————
Product: nginx
Publisher: Debian
Operating System: Debian GNU/Linux
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands — Remote/Unauthenticated
Denial of Service — Remote/Unauthenticated
Access Confidential Data — Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2021-23017
Reference: ESB-2021.1840
ESB-2021.1833
ESB-2021.1817
ESB-2021.1802
Original Bulletin:
http://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-4921
– ————————–BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT——————–
– —–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA512
– – ————————————————————————-
Debian Security Advisory DSA-4921-1 security@debian.org
https://www.debian.org/security/ Moritz Muehlenhoff
May 28, 2021 https://www.debian.org/security/faq
– – ————————————————————————-
Package : nginx
CVE ID : CVE-2021-23017
Debian Bug : 989095
Luis Merino, Markus Vervier and Eric Sesterhenn discovered an off-by-one
in Nginx, a high-performance web and reverse proxy server, which could
result in denial of service and potentially the execution of arbitrary
code.
For the stable distribution (buster), this problem has been fixed in
version 1.14.2-2+deb10u4.
We recommend that you upgrade your nginx packages.
For the detailed security status of nginx please refer to
its security tracker page at:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/nginx
Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://www.debian.org/security/
Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org
– —–BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE—–
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– —–END PGP SIGNATURE—–
– ————————–END INCLUDED TEXT——————–
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation’s
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT’s members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation’s
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author’s website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
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The post ESB-2021.1850 – [Debian] nginx: Multiple vulnerabilities appeared first on Malware Devil.
—–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA256
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2021.1851
nginx security update
31 May 2021
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
———————————
Product: nginx
Publisher: Debian
Operating System: Debian GNU/Linux
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands — Remote/Unauthenticated
Denial of Service — Remote/Unauthenticated
Access Confidential Data — Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2021-23017
Reference: ESB-2021.1840
ESB-2021.1833
ESB-2021.1817
ESB-2021.1802
Original Bulletin:
https://www.debian.org/lts/security/2021/dla-2670
– ————————–BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT——————–
– —–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA256
– – ———————————————————————–
Debian LTS Advisory DLA-2670-1 debian-lts@lists.debian.org
https://www.debian.org/lts/security/ Utkarsh Gupta
May 30, 2021 https://wiki.debian.org/LTS
– – ———————————————————————–
Package : nginx
Version : 1.10.3-1+deb9u6
CVE ID : CVE-2021-23017
Debian Bug : 989095
Luis Merino, Markus Vervier and Eric Sesterhenn discovered an off-by-one
in Nginx, a high-performance web and reverse proxy server, which could
result in denial of service and potentially the execution of arbitrary
code.
For Debian 9 stretch, this problem has been fixed in version
1.10.3-1+deb9u6.
We recommend that you upgrade your nginx packages.
For the detailed security status of nginx please refer to
its security tracker page at:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/nginx
Further information about Debian LTS security advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://wiki.debian.org/LTS
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– ————————–END INCLUDED TEXT——————–
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation’s
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT’s members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation’s
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author’s website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
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The post ESB-2021.1851 – [Debian] nginx: Multiple vulnerabilities appeared first on Malware Devil.
—–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA256
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2021.1852
samba security update
31 May 2021
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
———————————
Product: samba
Publisher: Debian
Operating System: Debian GNU/Linux
Impact/Access: Increased Privileges — Existing Account
Create Arbitrary Files — Remote with User Interaction
Denial of Service — Remote with User Interaction
Provide Misleading Information — Existing Account
Reduced Security — Existing Account
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2021-20254 CVE-2019-14907 CVE-2019-14902
CVE-2019-14870 CVE-2019-14861 CVE-2019-14847
CVE-2019-14833 CVE-2019-10218
Reference: ESB-2021.1557
ESB-2021.1497
ESB-2021.1478
Original Bulletin:
https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/05/msg00023.html
– ————————–BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT——————–
– —–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA512
– – ————————————————————————-
Debian LTS Advisory DLA-2668-1 debian-lts@lists.debian.org
https://www.debian.org/lts/security/ Abhijith PA
May 29, 2021 https://wiki.debian.org/LTS
– – ————————————————————————-
Package : samba
Version : 2:4.5.16+dfsg-1+deb9u4
CVE ID : CVE-2019-10218 CVE-2019-14833 CVE-2019-14847 CVE-2019-14861
CVE-2019-14870 CVE-2019-14902 CVE-2019-14907 CVE-2021-20254
Debian Bug : 946786
Several vulnerabilities were discovered in Samba, SMB/CIFS file,
print, and login server for Unix
CVE-2019-10218
A flaw was found in the samba client, where a malicious server can
supply a pathname to the client with separators. This could allow
the client to access files and folders outside of the SMB network
pathnames. An attacker could use this vulnerability to create
files outside of the current working directory using the
privileges of the client user.
CVE-2019-14833
A flaw was found in Samba, in the way it handles a user password
change or a new password for a samba user. The Samba Active
Directory Domain Controller can be configured to use a custom
script to check for password complexity. This configuration can
fail to verify password complexity when non-ASCII characters are
used in the password, which could lead to weak passwords being set
for samba users, making it vulnerable to dictionary attacks.
CVE-2019-14847
A flaw was found in samba where an attacker can crash AD DC LDAP
server via dirsync resulting in denial of service. Privilege
escalation is not possible with this issue.
CVE-2019-14861
Samba have an issue, where the (poorly named) dnsserver RPC pipe
provides administrative facilities to modify DNS records and
zones. Samba, when acting as an AD DC, stores DNS records in LDAP.
In AD, the default permissions on the DNS partition allow creation
of new records by authenticated users. This is used for example to
allow machines to self-register in DNS. If a DNS record was
created that case-insensitively matched the name of the zone, the
ldb_qsort() and dns_name_compare() routines could be confused into
reading memory prior to the list of DNS entries when responding to
DnssrvEnumRecords() or DnssrvEnumRecords2() and so following
invalid memory as a pointer.
CVE-2019-14870
Samba have an issue, where the S4U (MS-SFU) Kerberos delegation
model includes a feature allowing for a subset of clients to be
opted out of constrained delegation in any way, either S4U2Self or
regular Kerberos authentication, by forcing all tickets for these
clients to be non-forwardable. In AD this is implemented by a user
attribute delegation_not_allowed (aka not-delegated), which
translates to disallow-forwardable. However the Samba AD DC does
not do that for S4U2Self and does set the forwardable flag even if
the impersonated client has the not-delegated flag set.
CVE-2019-14902
There is an issue in samba, where the removal of the right to
create or modify a subtree would not automatically be taken away
on all domain controllers.
CVE-2019-14907
samba have an issue where if it is set with “log level = 3” (or
above) then the string obtained from the client, after a failed
character conversion, is printed. Such strings can be provided
during the NTLMSSP authentication exchange. In the Samba AD DC in
particular, this may cause a long-lived process(such as the RPC
server) to terminate. (In the file server case, the most likely
target, smbd, operates as process-per-client and so a crash there is harmless).
CVE-2021-20254
A flaw was found in samba. The Samba smbd file server must map
Windows group identities (SIDs) into unix group ids (gids). The
code that performs this had a flaw that could allow it to read
data beyond the end of the array in the case where a negative
cache entry had been added to the mapping cache. This could cause
the calling code to return those values into the process token
that stores the group membership for a user. The highest threat
from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity.
For Debian 9 stretch, these problems have been fixed in version
2:4.5.16+dfsg-1+deb9u4.
We recommend that you upgrade your samba packages.
For the detailed security status of samba please refer to
its security tracker page at:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/samba
Further information about Debian LTS security advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://wiki.debian.org/LTS
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– ————————–END INCLUDED TEXT——————–
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation’s
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT’s members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation’s
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author’s website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
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The post ESB-2021.1852 – [Debian] samba: Multiple vulnerabilities appeared first on Malware Devil.
—–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA256
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2021.1853
IBM Java Application – Arbitrary File Modification
31 May 2021
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
———————————
Product: IBM Java
Publisher: IBM
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact/Access: Modify Arbitrary Files — Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2021-2161
Reference: ASB-2021.0076
ESB-2021.1826
ESB-2021.1786
Original Bulletin:
https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6454459
– ————————–BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT——————–
CVE-2021-2161 may affect IBM® SDK, Java™ Technology Edition
Document Information
Document number : 6454459
Modified date : 28 May 2021
Product : IBM Java
Software version : All versions
Operating system(s): Platform Independent
Summary
CVE-2021-2161 was disclosed in the Oracle April 2021 Critical Patch Update.
Vulnerability Details
CVEID: CVE-2021-2161
DESCRIPTION: An unspecified vulnerability in Java SE related to the Libraries
component could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause no confidentiality
impact, high integrity impact, and no availability impact.
CVSS Base score: 5.9
CVSS Temporal Score: See: https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/
200290 for the current score.
CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)
Affected Products and Versions
7.0.0.0 – 7.0.10.80
7.1.0.0 – 7.1.4.80
8.0.0.0 – 8.0.6.25
11.0.0.0 – 11.0.10.0
Note: CVE-2021-2161 is applicable only on Windows.
Remediation/Fixes
7.0.10.85
7.1.4.85
8.0.6.30
11.0.11.0
Please refer to the IBM SDK, Java Technology Edition Security Vulnerabilities
page for more information.
IBM customers requiring an update for an SDK shipped with an IBM product should
contact IBM support , and/or refer to the appropriate product security
bulletin.
APAR number:
IJ32230 (CVE-2021-2161)
Workarounds and Mitigations
None
Oracle April 2021 Java SE Critical Patch Update Advisory
IBM SDK, Java Technology Edition Security Vulnerabilities
Acknowledgement
Change History
19 May 2021: Initial Publication
21 May 2021: Added note about platform applicability
28 May 2021: Added 11.0.11.0 to fixed releases
– ————————–END INCLUDED TEXT——————–
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation’s
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT’s members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation’s
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author’s website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
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The post ESB-2021.1853 – [Appliance] IBM Java: Modify arbitrary files – Remote/unauthenticated appeared first on Malware Devil.
—–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA256
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2021.1848
hyperkitty security update
31 May 2021
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
———————————
Product: hyperkitty
Publisher: Debian
Operating System: Debian GNU/Linux
UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
Impact/Access: Access Confidential Data — Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2021-33038
Original Bulletin:
http://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-4922
Comment: This advisory references vulnerabilities in products which run on
platforms other than Debian. It is recommended that administrators
running hyperkitty check for an updated version of the software for
their operating system.
– ————————–BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT——————–
– —–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
Hash: SHA512
– – ————————————————————————-
Debian Security Advisory DSA-4922-1 security@debian.org
https://www.debian.org/security/ Moritz Muehlenhoff
May 29, 2021 https://www.debian.org/security/faq
– – ————————————————————————-
Package : hyperkitty
CVE ID : CVE-2021-33038
Amir Sarabadani and Kunal Mehta discovered that the import functionality
of Hyperkitty, the web user interface to access Mailman 3 archives, did
not restrict the visibility of private archives during the import, i.e.
that during the import of a private Mailman 2 archive the archive was
publicly accessible until the import completed.
For the stable distribution (buster), this problem has been fixed in
version 1.2.2-1+deb10u1.
We recommend that you upgrade your hyperkitty packages.
For the detailed security status of hyperkitty please refer to
its security tracker page at:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/hyperkitty
Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://www.debian.org/security/
Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org
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– ————————–END INCLUDED TEXT——————–
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation’s
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT’s members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation’s
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author’s website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
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The post ESB-2021.1848 – [UNIX/Linux][Debian] hyperkitty: Access confidential data – Remote/unauthenticated appeared first on Malware Devil.
In 1801, the United States had a small Navy. Thomas Jefferson deployed almost half that Navy—three frigates and a schooner—to the Barbary C...
