Malware Devil

Friday, March 26, 2021

40% of Apps Leaking Information

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image2021 Top Enterprise IT TrendsWe’ve identified the key trends that are poised to impact the IT landscape in 2021. Find out why they’re important and how they will affect you today!
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How Enterprises are Developing Secure Applications
How Enterprises are Developing Secure Applications
Recent breaches of third-party apps are driving many organizations to think harder about the security of their off-the-shelf software as they continue to move left in secure software development practices.
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Bug Report

Enterprise Vulnerabilities
From DHS/US-CERT’s National Vulnerability Database
CVE-2021-3275
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Unauthenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) exists in multiple TP-Link products including WIFI Routers (Wireless AC routers), Access Points, ADSL + DSL Gateways and Routers, which affects TD-W9977v1, TL-WA801NDv5, TL-WA801Nv6, TL-WA802Nv5, and Archer C3150v2 devices through the improper valida…

CVE-2021-23889
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) prior to 5.10 Update 10 allows ePO administrators to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via multiple parameters where the administrator’s entries were not correctly sanitized.

CVE-2021-23890
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Information leak vulnerability in the Agent Handler of McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) prior to 5.10 Update 10 allows an unauthenticated user to download McAfee product packages (specifically McAfee Agent) available in ePO repository and install them on their own machines to have it managed and th…

CVE-2021-23888
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Unvalidated client-side URL redirect vulnerability in McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) prior to 5.10 Update 10 could cause an authenticated ePO user to load an untrusted site in an ePO iframe which could steal information from the authenticated user.

CVE-2021-20681
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Improper neutralization of JavaScript input in the page editing function of baserCMS versions prior to 4.4.5 allows remote authenticated attackers to inject an arbitrary script via unspecified vectors.

The post 40% of Apps Leaking Information appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/03/26/40-of-apps-leaking-information/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=40-of-apps-leaking-information

Apple Patches iOS Zero-Day

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Write a Caption, Win an Amazon Gift Card! Click Here
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Latest Comment: As God as my witness, I thought chickens could type.
image

Current Issue

image2021 Top Enterprise IT TrendsWe’ve identified the key trends that are poised to impact the IT landscape in 2021. Find out why they’re important and how they will affect you today!
image

Flash Poll

How Enterprises are Developing Secure Applications
How Enterprises are Developing Secure Applications
Recent breaches of third-party apps are driving many organizations to think harder about the security of their off-the-shelf software as they continue to move left in secure software development practices.
image

Twitter Feed

Dark Reading - Bug Report

Bug Report

Enterprise Vulnerabilities
From DHS/US-CERT’s National Vulnerability Database
CVE-2021-3275
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Unauthenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) exists in multiple TP-Link products including WIFI Routers (Wireless AC routers), Access Points, ADSL + DSL Gateways and Routers, which affects TD-W9977v1, TL-WA801NDv5, TL-WA801Nv6, TL-WA802Nv5, and Archer C3150v2 devices through the improper valida…

CVE-2021-23889
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) prior to 5.10 Update 10 allows ePO administrators to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via multiple parameters where the administrator’s entries were not correctly sanitized.

CVE-2021-23890
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Information leak vulnerability in the Agent Handler of McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) prior to 5.10 Update 10 allows an unauthenticated user to download McAfee product packages (specifically McAfee Agent) available in ePO repository and install them on their own machines to have it managed and th…

CVE-2021-23888
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Unvalidated client-side URL redirect vulnerability in McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) prior to 5.10 Update 10 could cause an authenticated ePO user to load an untrusted site in an ePO iframe which could steal information from the authenticated user.

CVE-2021-20681
PUBLISHED: 2021-03-26

Improper neutralization of JavaScript input in the page editing function of baserCMS versions prior to 4.4.5 allows remote authenticated attackers to inject an arbitrary script via unspecified vectors.

The post Apple Patches iOS Zero-Day appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/03/26/apple-patches-ios-zero-day/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=apple-patches-ios-zero-day

Executive Order Would Strengthen Cybersecurity Requirements for Federal Agencies

The post-SolarWinds EO could be issued as soon as next week, according to a report.
Read More

The post Executive Order Would Strengthen Cybersecurity Requirements for Federal Agencies appeared first on Malware Devil.



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Zero trust: Not the relationship type

Zero trust. It’s not exactly what you want in a relationship. But it’s everything you want in a remote access security solution.  So since we’re on the topic of relationships, let’s think about the qualities of a good relationship. Any good relationship is typically composed of some of the following elements: openness, communication, and trust. […]

The post Zero trust: Not the relationship type appeared first on SecureLink.

The post Zero trust: Not the relationship type appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Read More

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Open Redirects – An Underestimated Vulnerability – PSW #688

Learn what redirects are, the different types, how they work and how they are exploited by attackers. Oh, also learn how to defend against redirect attacks!

Sven’s Slide Deck – Open Redirects: https://securityweekly.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Netsparker-Sven-Morgenroth-3-25-21-Open-Redirect.pdf

This segment is sponsored by Netsparker.

Visit https://securityweekly.com/netsparker to learn more about them!

Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/psw for all the latest episodes!

Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw688

The post Open Redirects – An Underestimated Vulnerability – PSW #688 appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/03/26/open-redirects-an-underestimated-vulnerability-psw-688/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=open-redirects-an-underestimated-vulnerability-psw-688

Alan Turing, WWII Cryptanalyst and Computer Pioneer, on New £50 Note

The new 50 Pound note honors Alan Turing. Breaker of Nazi encryption and father of computing.

The post Alan Turing, WWII Cryptanalyst and Computer Pioneer, on New £50 Note appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Read More

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How application shielding fits into the DevSecOps framework

Incorporating application shielding into a DevSecOps framework helps developers strengthen core security and make the security testing and development process more efficient.

The post How application shielding fits into the DevSecOps framework appeared first on Intertrust Technologies.

The post How application shielding fits into the DevSecOps framework appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Read More

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Conducting an Effective Online Investigation: 5 Strategies for Law Enforcement Agencies

5 essential tips for law enforcement agencies to keep online investigations secure and anonymous. Learn how to protect your mission, your org and yourself.

The post Conducting an Effective Online Investigation: 5 Strategies for Law Enforcement Agencies appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Read More

The post Conducting an Effective Online Investigation: 5 Strategies for Law Enforcement Agencies appeared first on Malware Devil.



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Microsoft Shares Exchange Server Post-Compromise Attack Activity

Microsoft shares the details of post-exploitation attack activity, including multiple ransomware payloads and a cryptocurrency botnet.

Microsoft has shared intelligence detailing post-compromise activity seen in ongoing Exchange Server attacks, which have infected vulnerable targets with ransomware and a botnet, among other activity.

Organizations around the world were urged to patch their systems when Microsoft released a fix for Exchange Server zero-days on March 2. While patching for Exchange Server has ramped up, Microsoft reports, the updates won’t protect victims that have already been compromised.

This week the company released more information to warn of post-exploitation activity seen on Exchange Servers, which have been targeted by attackers ranging from cybercriminals to state-sponsored groups. While early attacks were attributed to a group Microsoft calls Hafnium, the weeks following its patch release have revealed “numerous other attackers” using the exploit.

This new threat data and technical details are meant to help defenders investigate whether they were attacked prior to patching and, if so, how they can respond.

Microsoft notes that many compromised systems have not yet seen secondary attacks such as ransomware or data exfiltration. This could indicate that attackers are perhaps laying low and remaining persistent for potential future attacks, the company says, or they could already by using credentials and other stolen data to compromise networks through other attack vectors.

As of March 25, many of the unpatched systems Microsoft observed had Web shells on them. The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency has specifically warned of the China Chopper Web shell and has added nine of them to its Exchange Server mitigation guidance.

Multiple ransomware families have been seen in the attacks. The first was a variant Microsoft calls DoejoCrypt; these attacks start with a variant of the Chopper Web shell being deployed to a compromised Exchange Server. The Web shell writes a batch file that does a backup of the Security Account Manager (SAM) database and System and Security registry hives, which allows attackers to access the passwords of local users.

In a blog post, the Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team emphasizes the importance of the principle of least privilege. Because of the configurations typically used on Exchange Servers, they say, many compromised systems are likely to have at least one service or task configured with a highly privileged account to complete tasks like backups.

“As service account credentials are not frequently changed, this could provide a great advantage to an attacker even if they lose their initial Web shell access due to an antivirus detection,” the team writes, as the account can later be used to elevate privileges.

While DoejoCrypt was a new form of ransomware, Microsoft points out that the access attackers gain through these vulnerabilities will likely be used by other groups in the future. This has already been seen with Pydomer, the first existing ransomware family to exploit the Exchange Server flaws. Pydomer has previously been seen distributing ransomware through bugs in Pulse Secure VPN.

In this attack, Pydomer operators scanned and compromised Exchange Servers en masse to drop a Web shell around March 18-20, 2021. The Web shells have been spotted on some 1,500 systems, Microsoft says, though not all were infected with ransomware. On the systems that were, attackers used a non-encryption extortion strategy similar to that of Maze and Egregor.

“This option might have been semiautomated on their part or a side effect of a failure in their encryption process, as some of the systems they accessed were test systems that showed no data exfiltration,” officials write, noting the ransom note should be taken seriously if received.

Microsoft notes that “the overall numbers of ransomware have remained extremely small to this point,” but it warns defenders to remember these threats demonstrate how attackers can quickly pivot their operations to target unpatched systems.

The team also detected multiple cryptocurrency miner campaigns among the first payloads seen stemming from post-exploit Web shells. Many of these campaigns had previously been targeting SharePoint servers and added Exchange Server to their targets. Specifically, they noticed Lemon Duck, a known cryptocurrency botnet, compromising “numerous” Exchange Sever targets and evolving to deploy malware in addition to mining cryptocurrency.

Kelly Sheridan is the Staff Editor at Dark Reading, where she focuses on cybersecurity news and analysis. She is a business technology journalist who previously reported for InformationWeek, where she covered Microsoft, and Insurance & Technology, where she covered financial … View Full Bio

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Employee Lockdown Stress May Spark Cybersecurity Risk

Younger employees and caregivers report more stress than other groups– and more shadow IT usage.
Read More

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A Day in the Life of a DevSecOps Manager

“Most days are good days,” says Rally Health’s Ari Kalfus. But they sure are busy, he tells The Edge.

Ari Kalfus is DevSecOps manager at digital health company Rally Health. He leads the application security direction for the enterprise and coordinates its internal and external penetration testing programs.

Dark Reading: What are some of the first things you do when you get to work?
Ari Kalfus: Check my email, check Slack notifications, plan which gif from PG Tips I want to add to my async standup notes.

DR: When you start your day, do you feel good about what you’ll be dealing with at work? Or concerned?
AK:
Most days are good days. I think this is really dependent on the culture of the company you work for more so than something specific to the practice of DevSecOps. If you’re supported by your company, it doesn’t necessarily matter that you have a ton of thorns to pluck during the workday. But if you’re not supported by your work environment, the most trivial of tasks will be grating.

DR: Break down your day for us.
AK:

10 a.m.– Time to start working. I participate in the security leadership sync meeting and discuss anything of primary concern for our department this week. For the next couple hours, I may have one-to-one conversations with my team or with partners in others areas of the organization, or perhaps an hour or two to make progress on an individual technical task.

Lunch! My partner exclaims at how little water I’ve drunk so far this day. I used to be the one that made pointed looks at her while I refilled my water bottle yet again. The pandemic has affected us all.

Afternoon The afternoon is typically either scheduled over with multiple meetings with groups looking for application security insight to an issue they are working on, communicating with other groups on a DevSecOps effort that spans across the org, or perhaps dedicated focus time to think about and make more longer-term plans for the appsec program or tackle a particularly thorny engineering problem to spare my team.

DR: Are there any particular focus areas or red flags that indicate to you it may be a trying day on the job?
AK: This may just be my personal view on application security, but I feel a component of DevSecOps is ensuring the security practices we require of engineering demonstrably reduce business risk. Some days, I have meetings with external customers, compliance folks, or others who do not necessarily agree. Those days are always trying.

DR: Examples, please?
AK: I don’t care, for example, that an internal service uses TLS 1.1 to talk to another internal service. [This is a manufactured example.] It would be great if they moved to the company standard of 1.2, but I’m not going to be on top of the team to migrate. I do care that those two services encrypt sensitive data across that communication channel – so I want to ensure they are using the cryptographic library our DevSecOps team maintains.

However, for some people a number above zero on a report means bad. Zero means good! It’s hard to come to a common understanding and path forward in those conversations. I think a defining principle when it comes to effective DevSecOps as opposed to more traditional application security approaches is the acceptance that context matters, and we should prioritize our time and our efforts in line with that context.

DR: What does a DevSecOps team do, really?
AK: The goal of a DevSecOps team, in my view, is embedding application security into development through enablement, iteration, and continuous feedback – also sometimes called “shifting security left.” This requires talking to other folks and making sure you can offer them something that solves your problem while enabling them to solve theirs.

No one wants to “stop” producing value to take care of security concerns, which can often be how it feels to interact with security teams. Everyone already has a full roadmap. Why does this security concern need to be addressed now? Through a DevSecOps philosophy, which mostly means taking agile principles from engineering and applying them to security work, I use those aforementioned days of meetings to determine how a particular security concern can be mitigated or eradicated without adding friction to the development pipeline.

DR: How do you that? Address security, avoid friction, make everyone happy?
AK: This means ignoring many of the more traditional, legacy application security practices, like static scans that take hours and mostly produce false positives, in favor of products or custom implementations that are highly targeted toward specific classes of vulnerabilities present in our environment.

Our DevSecOps team, for example, can write a cryptography library for engineering that uses standard libraries in an appropriate manner, avoiding common implementation mistakes that could lead to data exposure.

Sometimes we may mandate a particular approach, but typically we offer a library like this to engineering and sell it as saving them development time. “Don’t do it yourself! Just call the library method and move on with your roadmap! By the way, do this and our data protection security concerns get resolved.” This lets engineers produce their features faster while largely eliminating a particular security issue from our environment.

This only works if the library or process you offer actually makes development easier for engineers. So my team’s work is a collaboration with the engineers in our org to ensure the libraries, products, and tools we offer to engineering are serving their purpose – eliminating classes of security issues while enabling engineering to perform their work with less friction.

DR: So that’s how you make engineers happy. What about keeping your own team happy?
AK: The other side of this is, the DevSecOps/Appsec team is going to be many orders of magnitude smaller than the engineering organization. In order to be effective at delivering solutions, we need to minimize the amount of operational burden our solutions create for our team.

This usually means turning to cloud-native tools that enable us to offer functionality while minimizing operational overhead – integrate webhooks and offer APIs that trigger AWS Lambda functions, for example, that allow us to scale across all of engineering without adding the burden of managing servers or dealing with limited load capacity. I’m not claiming cloud-native tools are magic solutions, but they allow for architectures that minimize our overhead beyond what’s capable with traditional servers. We still have our share of bugs.

While I wouldn’t claim that an appsec team has more “customers” than an engineering team – you hopefully have more paying customers than you do engineers in your company – our customers sit, physically or virtually, right next to us, so if we produce content that isn’t reliable or causes friction, we will hear about it! So we have to have really excellent engineering processes on our own projects such that we can be extremely confident about the reliability and functionality of the things we push into developers’ workstreams.

DR: At the end of the day, what do you consider a “win”? How do you measure success?
AK: Are there fewer security concerns this month than last month? Are engineers today happy or upset with the processes we impose on them?

The Edge is Dark Reading’s home for features, threat data and in-depth perspectives on cybersecurity. View Full Bio

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A Day in the Life of a DevSecOps Manager

Ari Kalfus is DevSecOps Manager with Rally Health. He leads the application security direction for the enterprise and coordinates its internal and external penetration testing programs.

Dark Reading: What are some of the first things you do when you get to work?

Ari Kalfus: Check my email, check Slack notifications, plan which gif from PG Tips I want to add to my async standup notes.

DR: When you start your day, do you feel good about what you’ll be dealing with at work? Or concerned?

AK: Most days are good days. I think this is really dependent on the culture of the company you work for more so than something specific to the practice of DevSecOps. If you’re supported by your company, it doesn’t necessarily matter that you have a ton of thorns to pluck during the work day. But if you’re not supported by your work environment, the most trivial of tasks will be grating.

DR: Break down your day for us.

AK:

10 A.M.– Time to start working. I participate in the security leadership sync meeting and discuss anything of primary concern for our department this week. For the next couple hours, I may have 1×1 conversations with my team or with partners in others areas of the organization, or perhaps an hour or two to make progress on an individual technical task.

Lunch! My partner exclaims at how little water I’ve drunk so far this day. I used to be the one that made pointed looks at her while I refilled my water bottle yet again. The pandemic has affected us all.

Afternoon The afternoon is typically either scheduled over with multiple meetings with groups looking for application security insight to an issue they are working on, communicating with other groups on a DevSecOps effort that spans across the org, or perhaps dedicated focus time to think about and make more longer-term plans for the appsec program or tackle a particularly thorny engineering problem to spare my team.

DR: Are there any particular focus areas or red flags that indicate to you it may be a trying day on the job?

AK: This may just be my personal view on application security, but I feel a component of DevSecOps is ensuring the security practices we require of engineering demonstrably reduce business risk. Some days, I have meetings with external customers, compliance folks, or others who do not necessarily agree. Those days are always trying.

Examples please?

AK: I don’t care, for example, that an internal service uses TLS 1.1 to talk to another internal service. (This is a manufactured example). Would be great if they moved to the company standard of 1.2, but I’m not going to be on top of the team to migrate. I do care that those two services encrypt sensitive data across that communication channel – so I want to ensure they are using the cryptographic library our DevSecOps team maintains.

However, for some people a number above zero on a report means bad. Zero means good! It’s hard to come to a common understanding and path forward in those conversations. I think a defining principle when it comes to effective DevSecOps as opposed to more traditional application security approaches is the acceptance that context matters, and we should prioritize our time and our efforts in line with that context.

DR: What does a DevSecOps team do, really?

AK: The goal of a DevSecOps team, in my view, is embedding application security into development through enablement, iteration, and continuous feedback. Also sometimes called “shifting security left.” This requires talking to other folks and making sure you can offer them something that solves your problem while enabling them to solve theirs.

No one wants to “stop” producing value to take care of security concerns, which can often be how it feels to interact with security teams. Everyone already has a full roadmap. Why does this security concern need to be addressed now? Through a DevSecOps philosophy, which mostly means taking agile principles from engineering and applying them to security work, I use those aforementioned days of meetings to determine how a particular security concern can be mitigated or eradicated without adding friction to the development pipeline.

DR: How do you that? Address security, avoid friction, make everyone happy?

AK: This means ignoring many of the more traditional, legacy application security practices (like static scans that take hours and mostly produce false positives) in favor of products or custom implementations that are highly targeted toward specific classes of vulnerabilities present in our environment.

Our DevSecOps team, for example, can write a cryptography library for engineering that uses standard libraries in an appropriate manner, avoiding common implementation mistakes that could lead to data exposure.

Sometimes we may mandate a particular approach, but typically we offer a library like this to engineering and sell it as saving them development time. “Don’t do it yourself! Just call the library method and move on with your roadmap! By the way, do this and our data protection security concerns get resolved.” This lets engineers produce their features faster while largely eliminating a particular security issue from our environment.

This only works if the library or process you offer actually makes development easier for engineers. So, my team’s work is a collaboration with the engineers in our org to ensure the libraries, products, and tools we offer to engineering are serving their purpose – eliminating classes of security issues while enabling engineering to perform their work with less friction.

DR: So that’s how you make engineers happy…what about keeping your own team happy?

AK: The other side of this is: the DevSecOps/Appsec team is going to be many orders of magnitude smaller than the engineering organization. In order to be effective at delivering solutions we need to minimize the amount of operational burden our solutions create for our team.

This usually means turning to cloud-native tools that enable us to offer functionality while minimizing operational overhead – integrate webhooks and offer APIs that trigger AWS Lambda functions, for example, that allow us to scale across all of engineering without adding the burden of managing servers or dealing with limited load capacity. I’m not claiming cloud-native tools are magic solutions but they allow for architectures that minimize our overhead beyond what’s capable with traditional servers. We still have our share of bugs. 🙂

While I wouldn’t claim that an appsec team has more “customers” than an engineering team–you hopefully have more paying customers than you do engineers in your company–our customers sit, physically or virtually, right next to us so if we produce content that isn’t reliable or causes friction, we will hear about it! So, we have to have a really excellent engineering processes on our own projects such that we can be extremely confident about the reliability and functionality of the things we push into developers’ workstreams.

At the end of the day, what do you consider a “win”? How do you measure success?

Are there fewer security concerns this month than last month? Are engineers today happy or upset with the processes we impose on them?

The Edge is Dark Reading’s home for features, threat data and in-depth perspectives on cybersecurity. View Full Bio

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ESB-2021.1065 – [FreeBSD] openssl: Multiple vulnerabilities

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2021.1065
                    Multiple vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
                               26 March 2021

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           openssl
Publisher:         FreeBSD
Operating System:  FreeBSD
Impact/Access:     Denial of Service              -- Unknown/Unspecified
                   Access Confidential Data       -- Unknown/Unspecified
                   Provide Misleading Information -- Unknown/Unspecified
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2021-3450 CVE-2021-3449 

Reference:         ESB-2021.1063
                   ESB-2021.1061
                   ESB-2021.1056

Original Bulletin: 
   https://security.freebsd.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-21:07.openssl.asc

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-21:07.openssl                                    Security Advisory
                                                          The FreeBSD Project

Topic:          Multiple vulnerabilities in OpenSSL

Category:       contrib
Module:         openssl
Announced:      2021-03-25
Affects:        FreeBSD 12.2 and later
Corrected:      2021-03-25 15:45:19 UTC (stable/13, 13.0-STABLE)
                2021-03-25 16:25:06 UTC (releng/13.0, 13.0-RC3-p1)
                2021-03-25 17:14:46 UTC (stable/12, 12.2-STABLE)
                2021-03-25 23:45:45 UTC (releng/12.2, 12.2-RELEASE-p5)
CVE Name:       CVE-2021-3449, CVE-2021-3450

For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .

I.   Background

FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project.  The OpenSSL Project is a
collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
Open Source toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  It is
also a general-purpose cryptography library.

II.  Problem Description

This advisory covers two distinct OpenSSL issues:

The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the
certificates present in a certificate chain.  It is not set by default.
Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in the
chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added as an
additional strict check.  An error in the implementation of this check meant
that the result of a previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain
are valid CA certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the
check that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates.
[CVE-2021-3450]

A TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello message sent to a TLS server that omits
the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial
ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension results in a
NULL pointer dereference in the server. [CVE-2021-3449]

III. Impact

The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT issue can result in a bypass of the check that
non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates.

The renegotiation issue can result in a crash and a denial of service attack.

IV.  Workaround

For the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT issue, no workaround is available, but
software that doesn't explicitly set the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag is
unaffected.

For the renegotiation issue, either turning off TLSv1.2 (as TLSv1.3 is
unaffected) or turning off renegotiation on the TLS server mitigates the
issue.

V.   Solution

Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.

Perform one of the following:

1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:

Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:

# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# 

2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:

The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.

a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

[FreeBSD 13.x]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-21:07/openssl-13.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-21:07/openssl-13.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl-13.patch.asc

[FreeBSD 12.x]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-21:07/openssl-12.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-21:07/openssl-12.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl-12.patch.asc

b) Apply the patch.  Execute the following commands as root:

# cd /usr/src
# patch .

Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system.

VI.  Correction details

The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.

Branch/path                                                      Revision
- - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/13/                       b6c1fdcdf5033d20c61cc77d66f58f31cc65e2ba
releng/13.0/                     7d3f5a19f455e0e3fb17ac3f9af288e8c7fffc15
stable/12/                                                        r369521
releng/12.2/                                                      r369523
- - -------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FreeBSD 13.x]
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following
command in a checked out git repository, replacing NNNNNN with the revision
hash:

# git show --stat NNNNNN

Or visit the following URL, replace NNNNNN with the revision hash:



[FreeBSD 12.x]
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:

# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base

Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:



VII. References






The latest revision of this advisory is available at

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- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.

NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members.  As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.

NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin.  It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made.  If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.

Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above.  If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.

Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:

        https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/

===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
                which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
                On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
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ESB-2021.1064 – [Ubuntu] Firefox: Multiple vulnerabilities

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2021.1064
                    USN-4893-1: Firefox vulnerabilities
                               26 March 2021

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Firefox
Publisher:         Ubuntu
Operating System:  Ubuntu
Impact/Access:     Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote with User Interaction
                   Denial of Service               -- Remote with User Interaction
                   Provide Misleading Information  -- Remote with User Interaction
                   Access Confidential Data        -- Remote with User Interaction
                   Reduced Security                -- Remote with User Interaction
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2021-23988 CVE-2021-23987 CVE-2021-23986
                   CVE-2021-23985 CVE-2021-23984 CVE-2021-23983
                   CVE-2021-23982 CVE-2021-23981 

Reference:         ESB-2021.1060
                   ESB-2021.1057
                   ESB-2021.1003

Original Bulletin: 
   https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-4893-1

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

USN-4893-1: Firefox vulnerabilities
25 March 2021

Firefox could be made to crash or run programs as your login if it
opened a malicious website.
Releases

  o Ubuntu 20.10
  o Ubuntu 20.04 LTS
  o Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
  o Ubuntu 16.04 LTS

Packages

  o firefox - Mozilla Open Source web browser

Details

Multiple security issues were discovered in Firefox. If a user were
tricked into opening a specially crafted website, an attacker could
potentially exploit these to cause a denial of service, obtain sensitive
information, or execute arbitrary code. ( CVE-2021-23981 , CVE-2021-23982 ,
CVE-2021-23983 , CVE-2021-23987 , CVE-2021-23988 )

It was discovered that extensions could open popup windows with control
of the window title in some circumstances. If a user were tricked into
installing a specially crafted extension, an attacker could potentially
exploit this to spook a website and trick the user into providing
credentials. ( CVE-2021-23984 )

It was discovered that the DevTools remote debugging feature could be
enabled without an indication to the user. If a local attacker could
modify the browser configuration, a remote attacker could potentially
exploit this to obtain sensitive information. ( CVE-2021-23985 )

It was discovered that extensions could read the response of cross
origin requests in some circumstances. If a user were tricked into
installing a specially crafted extension, an attacker could potentially
exploit this to obtain sensitive information. ( CVE-2021-23986 )

Update instructions

The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following package
versions:

Ubuntu 20.10

  o firefox - 87.0+build3-0ubuntu0.20.10.1

Ubuntu 20.04

  o firefox - 87.0+build3-0ubuntu0.20.04.2

Ubuntu 18.04

  o firefox - 87.0+build3-0ubuntu0.18.04.2

Ubuntu 16.04

  o firefox - 87.0+build3-0ubuntu0.16.04.2

After a standard system update you need to restart Firefox to make
all the necessary changes.

References

  o CVE-2021-23987
  o CVE-2021-23986
  o CVE-2021-23985
  o CVE-2021-23988
  o CVE-2021-23984
  o CVE-2021-23981
  o CVE-2021-23982
  o CVE-2021-23983

- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.

NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members.  As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.

NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin.  It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made.  If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.

Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above.  If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.

Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:

        https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/

===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
                which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
                On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
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ESB-2021.1052 – [RedHat] OpenShift Container Platform 3.11.404: Denial of service – Remote/unauthenticated

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2021.1052
     OpenShift Container Platform 3.11.404 security and bug fix update
                               26 March 2021

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           OpenShift Container Platform 3.11.404
Publisher:         Red Hat
Operating System:  Red Hat
Impact/Access:     Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2020-27813  

Reference:         ESB-2021.0864
                   ESB-2021.0692

Original Bulletin: 
   https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:0833

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

=====================================================================
                   Red Hat Security Advisory

Synopsis:          Moderate: OpenShift Container Platform 3.11.404 security and bug fix update
Advisory ID:       RHSA-2021:0833-01
Product:           Red Hat OpenShift Enterprise
Advisory URL:      https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:0833
Issue date:        2021-03-25
CVE Names:         CVE-2020-27813 
=====================================================================

1. Summary:

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform release 3.11.404 is now available with
updates to packages and images that fix several bugs and add enhancements.

Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact
of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which
gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from
the CVE link(s) in the References section.

2. Relevant releases/architectures:

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 3.11 - noarch, ppc64le, x86_64

3. Description:

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing
Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private
cloud deployments.

This advisory contains the RPM packages for Red Hat OpenShift Container
Platform 3.11.404. See the following advisory for the container images for
this release:

https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2021:0832

This release fixes the following bugs:

* Previously, node upgrade playbooks scoped all nodes instead of just the
nodes that are filtered by the `openshift_upgrade_nodes_label`. As a
result, nodes that were not intended to be upgraded had yum excluders
disabled but not reenabled. With this release, the initialization of the
variable for filtering nodes to upgrade is moved to earlier in the play,
and  preconfiguration is scoped to the filtered list of nodes. As a result,
only the nodes that are intended for upgrade have yum excluders disabled.
(BZ#1917013)

* Previously, node-based facts, such as `l_kubelet_node_name`, were set
late in the upgrade cycle, causing the fact to be undefined when
referenced. With this release, node-based fact initialization happens
earlier in the upgrade cycle so that facts are set prior to being
referenced. (BZ#1933090)

* Previously, a bug fix in Ansible 2.9.10 changed the behavior of
`delegate_to` for plays using `connection: local` with `hosts: localhost`.
This change caused tasks that are intended for remote hosts to be executed
locally. With this release, `connection: local` is removed for the affected
play, and tasks intended for remote hosts are executed on the remote host. 
(BZ#1934136)

Security Fix(es):

* golang-github-gorilla-websocket: integer overflow leads to denial of
service (CVE-2020-27813)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS
score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE
page(s) listed in the References section.

4. Solution:

See the following documentation, which will be updated shortly for release
3.11.404, for important instructions on how to upgrade your cluster and
fully apply this asynchronous errata update:

https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/3.11/release_notes/ocp_3_11_r
elease_notes.html

This update is available via the Red Hat Network. Details on how to use the
Red Hat Network to apply this update are available at
https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258.

5. Bugs fixed (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/):

1902111 - CVE-2020-27813 golang-github-gorilla-websocket: integer overflow leads 
to denial of service
1917013 - yum excluders are not set back in nodes after upgrade when it is done 
in separate phases and "openshift_upgrade_nodes_label" parameter is used to filter 
which nodes should be upgraded at a time
1933090 - [3.11] Upgrade fails when specifying openshift_upgrade_nodes_label
1934136 - [AWS] The `build_ami.yml` playbook to create the primed image for Cluster 
Autoscaler is restarting the host.

6. Package List:

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 3.11:

Source:
atomic-enterprise-service-catalog-3.11.404-1.git.1675.3094ee9.el7.src.rpm
atomic-openshift-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.src.rpm
atomic-openshift-cluster-autoscaler-3.11.404-1.git.0.2c258fe.el7.src.rpm
atomic-openshift-descheduler-3.11.404-1.git.299.2bfbb2f.el7.src.rpm
atomic-openshift-dockerregistry-3.11.404-1.git.481.5000e2c.el7.src.rpm
atomic-openshift-metrics-server-3.11.404-1.git.53.b9081b6.el7.src.rpm
atomic-openshift-node-problem-detector-3.11.400-1.git.263.930aa57.el7.src.rpm
atomic-openshift-service-idler-3.11.404-1.git.15.6c64591.el7.src.rpm
atomic-openshift-web-console-3.11.404-1.git.677.0e37db7.el7.src.rpm
golang-github-openshift-oauth-proxy-3.11.404-1.git.439.06870e9.el7.src.rpm
golang-github-prometheus-alertmanager-3.11.404-1.git.0.2817295.el7.src.rpm
golang-github-prometheus-node_exporter-3.11.404-1.git.1062.611825d.el7.src.rpm
golang-github-prometheus-prometheus-3.11.404-1.git.5026.5f1d705.el7.src.rpm
openshift-ansible-3.11.404-1.git.0.d161108.el7.src.rpm
openshift-enterprise-autoheal-3.11.404-1.git.218.c348621.el7.src.rpm
openshift-enterprise-cluster-capacity-3.11.404-1.git.379.e6e2a1d.el7.src.rpm
openshift-kuryr-3.11.404-1.git.1494.91fb403.el7.src.rpm

noarch:
atomic-openshift-docker-excluder-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.noarch.rpm
atomic-openshift-excluder-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.noarch.rpm
openshift-ansible-3.11.404-1.git.0.d161108.el7.noarch.rpm
openshift-ansible-docs-3.11.404-1.git.0.d161108.el7.noarch.rpm
openshift-ansible-playbooks-3.11.404-1.git.0.d161108.el7.noarch.rpm
openshift-ansible-roles-3.11.404-1.git.0.d161108.el7.noarch.rpm
openshift-ansible-test-3.11.404-1.git.0.d161108.el7.noarch.rpm
openshift-kuryr-cni-3.11.404-1.git.1494.91fb403.el7.noarch.rpm
openshift-kuryr-common-3.11.404-1.git.1494.91fb403.el7.noarch.rpm
openshift-kuryr-controller-3.11.404-1.git.1494.91fb403.el7.noarch.rpm
python2-kuryr-kubernetes-3.11.404-1.git.1494.91fb403.el7.noarch.rpm

ppc64le:
atomic-enterprise-service-catalog-3.11.404-1.git.1675.3094ee9.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-enterprise-service-catalog-svcat-3.11.404-1.git.1675.3094ee9.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-clients-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-cluster-autoscaler-3.11.404-1.git.0.2c258fe.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-descheduler-3.11.404-1.git.299.2bfbb2f.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-hyperkube-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-hypershift-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-master-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-metrics-server-3.11.404-1.git.53.b9081b6.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-node-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-node-problem-detector-3.11.400-1.git.263.930aa57.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-pod-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-sdn-ovs-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-service-idler-3.11.404-1.git.15.6c64591.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-template-service-broker-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-tests-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.ppc64le.rpm
atomic-openshift-web-console-3.11.404-1.git.677.0e37db7.el7.ppc64le.rpm
golang-github-openshift-oauth-proxy-3.11.404-1.git.439.06870e9.el7.ppc64le.rpm
openshift-enterprise-autoheal-3.11.404-1.git.218.c348621.el7.ppc64le.rpm
openshift-enterprise-cluster-capacity-3.11.404-1.git.379.e6e2a1d.el7.ppc64le.rpm
prometheus-3.11.404-1.git.5026.5f1d705.el7.ppc64le.rpm
prometheus-alertmanager-3.11.404-1.git.0.2817295.el7.ppc64le.rpm
prometheus-node-exporter-3.11.404-1.git.1062.611825d.el7.ppc64le.rpm

x86_64:
atomic-enterprise-service-catalog-3.11.404-1.git.1675.3094ee9.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-enterprise-service-catalog-svcat-3.11.404-1.git.1675.3094ee9.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-clients-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-clients-redistributable-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-cluster-autoscaler-3.11.404-1.git.0.2c258fe.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-descheduler-3.11.404-1.git.299.2bfbb2f.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-dockerregistry-3.11.404-1.git.481.5000e2c.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-hyperkube-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-hypershift-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-master-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-metrics-server-3.11.404-1.git.53.b9081b6.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-node-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-node-problem-detector-3.11.400-1.git.263.930aa57.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-pod-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-sdn-ovs-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-service-idler-3.11.404-1.git.15.6c64591.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-template-service-broker-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-tests-3.11.404-1.git.0.dd58619.el7.x86_64.rpm
atomic-openshift-web-console-3.11.404-1.git.677.0e37db7.el7.x86_64.rpm
golang-github-openshift-oauth-proxy-3.11.404-1.git.439.06870e9.el7.x86_64.rpm
openshift-enterprise-autoheal-3.11.404-1.git.218.c348621.el7.x86_64.rpm
openshift-enterprise-cluster-capacity-3.11.404-1.git.379.e6e2a1d.el7.x86_64.rpm
prometheus-3.11.404-1.git.5026.5f1d705.el7.x86_64.rpm
prometheus-alertmanager-3.11.404-1.git.0.2817295.el7.x86_64.rpm
prometheus-node-exporter-3.11.404-1.git.1062.611825d.el7.x86_64.rpm

These packages are GPG signed by Red Hat for security.  Our key and
details on how to verify the signature are available from
https://access.redhat.com/security/team/key/

7. References:

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2020-27813
https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#moderate

8. Contact:

The Red Hat security contact is . More contact
details at https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/

Copyright 2021 Red Hat, Inc.
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