Malware Devil

Tuesday, April 20, 2021

FIN7 sysadmin behind “billions in damage” gets 10 years

In 2018 three high-ranking members of a sophisticated international cybercrime group operating out of Eastern Europe were arrested and taken into custody by US authorities. Ukrainian nationals Dmytro Fedorov, Fedir Hladyr, and Andrii Kolpakov, were members of a prolific hacking group widely known as FIN7.

Hladyr is the systems administrator for the FIN7 hacking group, and is considered the mastermind behind the Carbanak campaign, a series of cyberattacks said to stolen as much as $900 million from banks in early part of the last decade. Last week Hladyr was sentenced in the Western District of Washington to 10 years in prison for his high-level role in FIN7.

The Carbanak campaign first made international headlines in 2015 as one of the first malware campaigns that specialized in remote ATM robberies. But FIN7 had already been active for a few years at that point and was involved in a lot more banking and financial malware than just the ATM machines manipulation.

The malware

Since 2013 FIN7 have attempted to attack banks, e-payment systems, and financial institutions using pieces of malware they designed, known as Carbanak and Cobalt. Carbanak is considered a further development of the Anunak malware campaign that targeted financial transfers and ATM networks of financial institutions around the world.

The campaigns all started with spear-phishing targeted at bank employees. When targets executed a malicious attachment the criminals were able to remotely control the victims’ infected machine. With access to a bank’s internal network, they were able to work their way internally until they gained control of the servers controlling ATMs.

A very detailed analysis of Anunak by Fox-IT and Group-IB can be found here (pdf).

By the following year, the same coders had improved the Anunak malware into a more sophisticated version, known as Carbanak. From then onwards, FIN7 focused its efforts on developing an even more sophisticated wave of attacks by using tailor-made malware based on the Cobalt Strike penetration testing software, but Carbanak remained part of their toolset.

In the US alone, FIN7 successfully breached the computer networks of companies in 47 states and the District of Columbia, stealing more than 15 million customer card records from over 6,500 individual point-of-sale terminals at more than 3,600 separate business locations.

Attribution

Many believe that the Carbanak malware was used by at least two separate entities. FIN7 and the Carbanak Group. This can be very confusing when trying to establish a timeline. Or when trying to solve any “whodunnit” mysteries. Once malware has been released and has proven to be successful you can count on other criminals trying to steal, copy, or rip off the code and techniques. So, if the Carbanak malware was used in a specific attack, it is not always clear which group was behind that attack, although it is clear that FIN7 was one of its users.

The arrest

The leader of the crime gang behind the Carbanak and Cobalt malware attacks was arrested in Alicante, Spain. The arrest was announced by Europol on 26 March 2018. According to Europol, the activities of the gang were believed to have resulted in losses of over EUR 1 billion for the financial industry.

Arresting the leader of that group did not stop the activities of the group though. The FIN7 campaigns appear to have continued, with the Hudson’s Bay Company breach using point-of-sale malware in April of 2018 being attributed to the group.

The arrest of Hladyr in August of 2018 at the request of the US Department of Justice, along with two other high-ranking members of the group did not have that effect either. In 2020 a cooperation between FIN7 and the Ryuk operators was suspected when the tools and techniques of FIN7, including the Carbanak Remote Administration Tool (RAT), were used to take over the network of an enterprise.

The conviction

After being extradited to the US in 2019, Hladyr pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit computer hacking, in his role as the systems administrator of the FIN7 group.

According to acting US Attorney Tessa M. Gorman of the Western District of Washington:

This criminal organization had more than 70 people organized into business units and teams.  Some were hackers, others developed the malware installed on computers, and still others crafted the malicious emails that duped victims into infecting their company systems. This defendant worked at the intersection of all these activities and thus bears heavy responsibility for billions in damage caused to companies and individual consumers.

The Department of Justice says that Hladyr joined FIN7 via a front company called Combi Security but soon learned that it was a fake cybersecurity company with a phony website and no legitimate customers. It asserts that Hladyr served as FIN7’s systems administrator and played a central role in aggregating stolen payment card information, supervising FIN7’s hackers, and maintaining the servers used to attack and control victims’ computers. Hladyr also controlled the organization’s encrypted channels of communication.

The post FIN7 sysadmin behind “billions in damage” gets 10 years appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

The post FIN7 sysadmin behind “billions in damage” gets 10 years appeared first on Malware Devil.



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CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack

CodeCov, a company that creates software auditing tools for developers, was recently breached (the company says it was breached on April 1, and reported it on the April 15). According to investigators, this incident, in turn, gave attackers access to an unknown number of CodeCov’s clients’ networks.

One cannot help but think that this knock-on breach effect is a supply-chain attack, similar to what happened to SolarWinds and their clients.

As you may recall, in the SolarWinds attack multiple companies reported being breached by state-sponsored adversaries, following an attack on the IT company SolarWinds that resulted in undetected modifications to its products. Those affected included FireEye, which resulted in the theft of their Red Team assessment tools; Microsoft; and departments in the US Treasury and Commerce.

Like SolarWinds, this seems like another attempt to add malicious code to products supplied to other organizations, so as to compromise those organizations, and potentially the software products they supply too.

CodeCov said that its Bash Uploader script, used by clients to find and upload code coverage reports to CodeCov, had been initially tampered with at the end of January this year. This wouldn’t have been found out if a client hadn’t raised concerns on April 1. According to the company, attackers were able to gain access to and alter the script by exploiting an error in CodeCov’s Docker image creation process.

A security update post by CodeCov states:

Our investigation has determined that beginning January 31, 2021, there were periodic, unauthorized alterations of our Bash Uploader script by a third party, which enabled them to potentially export information stored in our users’ continuous integration (CI) environments. This information was then sent to a third-party server outside of Codecov’s infrastructure,”

Because the script is allowed to search through users’ code it potentially has access to any credentials stored with that code. This could have given the attackers access to systems inside CodeCov’s clients’ networks, and in turn, the code that those companies are developing and supplying to others. And because it is expected to upload data outside of the clients’ networks, the upload script also offered an easy exfiltration route for the stolen data.

According to Reuters, the CodeCov attackers rapidly copied and pasted credentials from compromised customers, via an automated script, and used an automated way of searching for other resources (it’s not clear if these are references to the bash upload script, which seems to fit that description, or some other tools). “The hackers put extra effort into using CodeCov to get inside other makers of software development programs, as well as companies that themselves provide many customers with technology services, including IBM,” Reuters also revealed in an interview with one of the investigators.

Reuters reports that IBM, Atlassian, and other clients of CodeCov have claimed that their code has not been altered, while not address issues on credentials. Hewlett Packard Enterprise, another CodeCov client, has yet to determine if they or any of their clients have been affected by this breach according to the news service.

CodeCov says the modified Bash Uploader could affect:

– Any credentials, tokens, or keys that our customers were passing through their [Continuous Integration] runner that would be accessible when the Bash Uploader script was executed.

– Any services, data stores, and application code that could be accessed with these credentials, tokens, or keys.

– The git remote information (URL of the origin repository) of repositories using the Bash Uploaders to upload coverage to Codecov in CI.

CodeCov has a list of recommended actions to take. This includes “all of their credentials, tokens, or keys located in the environment variables in their CI processes that used one of Codecov’s Bash Uploaders.” If you’re a CodeCov client, go here for more details. You will also find in there a list of actions they have taken in response to this breach.

The post CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

The post CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack-5/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack-5

Attackers Compromised Code-Checking Vendor’s Tool for Two Months

A script used to upload sensitive reports-with access to credentials and datastores-likely sent information on hundreds, possibly thousands, of companies to attackers.

The post Attackers Compromised Code-Checking Vendor’s Tool for Two Months appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/attackers-compromised-code-checking-vendors-tool-for-two-months/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=attackers-compromised-code-checking-vendors-tool-for-two-months

FIN7 sysadmin behind “billions in damage” gets 10 years

In 2018 three high-ranking members of a sophisticated international cybercrime group operating out of Eastern Europe were arrested and taken into custody by US authorities. Ukrainian nationals Dmytro Fedorov, Fedir Hladyr, and Andrii Kolpakov, were members of a prolific hacking group widely known as FIN7.

Hladyr is the systems administrator for the FIN7 hacking group, and is considered the mastermind behind the Carbanak campaign, a series of cyberattacks said to stolen as much as $900 million from banks in early part of the last decade. Last week Hladyr was sentenced in the Western District of Washington to 10 years in prison for his high-level role in FIN7.

The Carbanak campaign first made international headlines in 2015 as one of the first malware campaigns that specialized in remote ATM robberies. But FIN7 had already been active for a few years at that point and was involved in a lot more banking and financial malware than just the ATM machines manipulation.

The malware

Since 2013 FIN7 have attempted to attack banks, e-payment systems, and financial institutions using pieces of malware they designed, known as Carbanak and Cobalt. Carbanak is considered a further development of the Anunak malware campaign that targeted financial transfers and ATM networks of financial institutions around the world.

The campaigns all started with spear-phishing targeted at bank employees. When targets executed a malicious attachment the criminals were able to remotely control the victims’ infected machine. With access to a bank’s internal network, they were able to work their way internally until they gained control of the servers controlling ATMs.

A very detailed analysis of Anunak by Fox-IT and Group-IB can be found here (pdf).

By the following year, the same coders had improved the Anunak malware into a more sophisticated version, known as Carbanak. From then onwards, FIN7 focused its efforts on developing an even more sophisticated wave of attacks by using tailor-made malware based on the Cobalt Strike penetration testing software, but Carbanak remained part of their toolset.

In the US alone, FIN7 successfully breached the computer networks of companies in 47 states and the District of Columbia, stealing more than 15 million customer card records from over 6,500 individual point-of-sale terminals at more than 3,600 separate business locations.

Attribution

Many believe that the Carbanak malware was used by at least two separate entities. FIN7 and the Carbanak Group. This can be very confusing when trying to establish a timeline. Or when trying to solve any “whodunnit” mysteries. Once malware has been released and has proven to be successful you can count on other criminals trying to steal, copy, or rip off the code and techniques. So, if the Carbanak malware was used in a specific attack, it is not always clear which group was behind that attack, although it is clear that FIN7 was one of its users.

The arrest

The leader of the crime gang behind the Carbanak and Cobalt malware attacks was arrested in Alicante, Spain. The arrest was announced by Europol on 26 March 2018. According to Europol, the activities of the gang were believed to have resulted in losses of over EUR 1 billion for the financial industry.

Arresting the leader of that group did not stop the activities of the group though. The FIN7 campaigns appear to have continued, with the Hudson’s Bay Company breach using point-of-sale malware in April of 2018 being attributed to the group.

The arrest of Hladyr in August of 2018 at the request of the US Department of Justice, along with two other high-ranking members of the group did not have that effect either. In 2020 a cooperation between FIN7 and the Ryuk operators was suspected when the tools and techniques of FIN7, including the Carbanak Remote Administration Tool (RAT), were used to take over the network of an enterprise.

The conviction

After being extradited to the US in 2019, Hladyr pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit computer hacking, in his role as the systems administrator of the FIN7 group.

According to acting US Attorney Tessa M. Gorman of the Western District of Washington:

This criminal organization had more than 70 people organized into business units and teams.  Some were hackers, others developed the malware installed on computers, and still others crafted the malicious emails that duped victims into infecting their company systems. This defendant worked at the intersection of all these activities and thus bears heavy responsibility for billions in damage caused to companies and individual consumers.

The Department of Justice says that Hladyr joined FIN7 via a front company called Combi Security but soon learned that it was a fake cybersecurity company with a phony website and no legitimate customers. It asserts that Hladyr served as FIN7’s systems administrator and played a central role in aggregating stolen payment card information, supervising FIN7’s hackers, and maintaining the servers used to attack and control victims’ computers. Hladyr also controlled the organization’s encrypted channels of communication.

The post FIN7 sysadmin behind “billions in damage” gets 10 years appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

The post FIN7 sysadmin behind “billions in damage” gets 10 years appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/fin7-sysadmin-behind-billions-in-damage-gets-10-years/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=fin7-sysadmin-behind-billions-in-damage-gets-10-years

SonicWall releases Security Notice: Email Security Zero-Day Vulnerabilities https://bit.ly/3eh1r9n, (Tue, Apr 20th)

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Read More

The post SonicWall releases Security Notice: Email Security Zero-Day Vulnerabilities https://bit.ly/3eh1r9n, (Tue, Apr 20th) appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/sonicwall-releases-security-notice-email-security-zero-day-vulnerabilities-https-bit-ly-3eh1r9n-tue-apr-20th/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=sonicwall-releases-security-notice-email-security-zero-day-vulnerabilities-https-bit-ly-3eh1r9n-tue-apr-20th

Mozilla Fixes Firefox Flaw That Allowed Spoofing of HTTPS Browser Padlock

The Mozilla Foundation releases Firefox 88, fixing 13 bugs ranging from high to low severity.
Read More

The post Mozilla Fixes Firefox Flaw That Allowed Spoofing of HTTPS Browser Padlock appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/mozilla-fixes-firefox-flaw-that-allowed-spoofing-of-https-browser-padlock/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=mozilla-fixes-firefox-flaw-that-allowed-spoofing-of-https-browser-padlock

Facebook Security Knew in 2017 There Was a Problem and Failed to Act

A harsh new report about notifications to Facebook in 2017, based on an allegedly leaked internal email, tells us what we’ve all known since at least 2015. Facebook knew there was a problem, and failed to do anything until half a billion users’ details were released… Security at Facebook has been operating as a farce. … Continue reading Facebook Security Knew in 2017 There Was a Problem and Failed to Act

The post Facebook Security Knew in 2017 There Was a Problem and Failed to Act appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Read More

The post Facebook Security Knew in 2017 There Was a Problem and Failed to Act appeared first on Malware Devil.



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CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack

CodeCov, a company that creates software auditing tools for developers, was recently breached (the company says it was breached on April 1, and reported it on the April 15). According to investigators, this incident, in turn, gave attackers access to an unknown number of CodeCov’s clients’ networks.

One cannot help but think that this knock-on breach effect is a supply-chain attack, similar to what happened to SolarWinds and their clients.

As you may recall, in the SolarWinds attack multiple companies reported being breached by state-sponsored adversaries, following an attack on the IT company SolarWinds that resulted in undetected modifications to its products. Those affected included FireEye, which resulted in the theft of their Red Team assessment tools; Microsoft; and departments in the US Treasury and Commerce.

Like SolarWinds, this seems like another attempt to add malicious code to products supplied to other organizations, so as to compromise those organizations, and potentially the software products they supply too.

CodeCov said that its Bash Uploader script, used by clients to find and upload code coverage reports to CodeCov, had been initially tampered with at the end of January this year. This wouldn’t have been found out if a client hadn’t raised concerns on April 1. According to the company, attackers were able to gain access to and alter the script by exploiting an error in CodeCov’s Docker image creation process.

A security update post by CodeCov states:

Our investigation has determined that beginning January 31, 2021, there were periodic, unauthorized alterations of our Bash Uploader script by a third party, which enabled them to potentially export information stored in our users’ continuous integration (CI) environments. This information was then sent to a third-party server outside of Codecov’s infrastructure,”

Because the script is allowed to search through users’ code it potentially has access to any credentials stored with that code. This could have given the attackers access to systems inside CodeCov’s clients’ networks, and in turn, the code that those companies are developing and supplying to others. And because it is expected to upload data outside of the clients’ networks, the upload script also offered an easy exfiltration route for the stolen data.

According to Reuters, the CodeCov attackers rapidly copied and pasted credentials from compromised customers, via an automated script, and used an automated way of searching for other resources (it’s not clear if these are references to the bash upload script, which seems to fit that description, or some other tools). “The hackers put extra effort into using CodeCov to get inside other makers of software development programs, as well as companies that themselves provide many customers with technology services, including IBM,” Reuters also revealed in an interview with one of the investigators.

Reuters reports that IBM, Atlassian, and other clients of CodeCov have claimed that their code has not been altered, while not address issues on credentials. Hewlett Packard Enterprise, another CodeCov client, has yet to determine if they or any of their clients have been affected by this breach according to the news service.

CodeCov says the modified Bash Uploader could affect:

– Any credentials, tokens, or keys that our customers were passing through their [Continuous Integration] runner that would be accessible when the Bash Uploader script was executed.

– Any services, data stores, and application code that could be accessed with these credentials, tokens, or keys.

– The git remote information (URL of the origin repository) of repositories using the Bash Uploaders to upload coverage to Codecov in CI.

CodeCov has a list of recommended actions to take. This includes “all of their credentials, tokens, or keys located in the environment variables in their CI processes that used one of Codecov’s Bash Uploaders.” If you’re a CodeCov client, go here for more details. You will also find in there a list of actions they have taken in response to this breach.

The post CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

The post CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack-4/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack-4

CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack

CodeCov, a company that creates software auditing tools for developers, was recently breached (the company says it was breached on April 1, and reported it on the April 15). According to investigators, this incident, in turn, gave attackers access to an unknown number of CodeCov’s clients’ networks.

One cannot help but think that this knock-on breach effect is a supply-chain attack, similar to what happened to SolarWinds and their clients.

As you may recall, in the SolarWinds attack multiple companies reported being breached by state-sponsored adversaries, following an attack on the IT company SolarWinds that resulted in undetected modifications to its products. Those affected included FireEye, which resulted in the theft of their Red Team assessment tools; Microsoft; and departments in the US Treasury and Commerce.

Like SolarWinds, this seems like another attempt to add malicious code to products supplied to other organizations, so as to compromise those organizations, and potentially the software products they supply too.

CodeCov said that its Bash Uploader script, used by clients to find and upload code coverage reports to CodeCov, had been initially tampered with at the end of January this year. This wouldn’t have been found out if a client hadn’t raised concerns on April 1. According to the company, attackers were able to gain access to and alter the script by exploiting an error in CodeCov’s Docker image creation process.

A security update post by CodeCov states:

Our investigation has determined that beginning January 31, 2021, there were periodic, unauthorized alterations of our Bash Uploader script by a third party, which enabled them to potentially export information stored in our users’ continuous integration (CI) environments. This information was then sent to a third-party server outside of Codecov’s infrastructure,”

Because the script is allowed to search through users’ code it potentially has access to any credentials stored with that code. This could have given the attackers access to systems inside CodeCov’s clients’ networks, and in turn, the code that those companies are developing and supplying to others. And because it is expected to upload data outside of the clients’ networks, the upload script also offered an easy exfiltration route for the stolen data.

According to Reuters, the CodeCov attackers rapidly copied and pasted credentials from compromised customers, via an automated script, and used an automated way of searching for other resources (it’s not clear if these are references to the bash upload script, which seems to fit that description, or some other tools). “The hackers put extra effort into using CodeCov to get inside other makers of software development programs, as well as companies that themselves provide many customers with technology services, including IBM,” Reuters also revealed in an interview with one of the investigators.

Reuters reports that IBM, Atlassian, and other clients of CodeCov have claimed that their code has not been altered, while not address issues on credentials. Hewlett Packard Enterprise, another CodeCov client, has yet to determine if they or any of their clients have been affected by this breach according to the news service.

CodeCov says the modified Bash Uploader could affect:

– Any credentials, tokens, or keys that our customers were passing through their [Continuous Integration] runner that would be accessible when the Bash Uploader script was executed.

– Any services, data stores, and application code that could be accessed with these credentials, tokens, or keys.

– The git remote information (URL of the origin repository) of repositories using the Bash Uploaders to upload coverage to Codecov in CI.

CodeCov has a list of recommended actions to take. This includes “all of their credentials, tokens, or keys located in the environment variables in their CI processes that used one of Codecov’s Bash Uploaders.” If you’re a CodeCov client, go here for more details. You will also find in there a list of actions they have taken in response to this breach.

The post CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack-3/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack-3

CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack

CodeCov, a company that creates software auditing tools for developers, was recently breached (the company says it was breached on April 1, and reported it on the April 15). According to investigators, this incident, in turn, gave attackers access to an unknown number of CodeCov’s clients’ networks.

One cannot help but think that this knock-on breach effect is a supply-chain attack, similar to what happened to SolarWinds and their clients.

As you may recall, in the SolarWinds attack multiple companies reported being breached by state-sponsored adversaries, following an attack on the IT company SolarWinds that resulted in undetected modifications to its products. Those affected included FireEye, which resulted in the theft of their Red Team assessment tools; Microsoft; and departments in the US Treasury and Commerce.

Like SolarWinds, this seems like another attempt to add malicious code to products supplied to other organizations, so as to compromise those organizations, and potentially the software products they supply too.

CodeCov said that its Bash Uploader script, used by clients to find and upload code coverage reports to CodeCov, had been initially tampered with at the end of January this year. This wouldn’t have been found out if a client hadn’t raised concerns on April 1. According to the company, attackers were able to gain access to and alter the script by exploiting an error in CodeCov’s Docker image creation process.

A security update post by CodeCov states:

Our investigation has determined that beginning January 31, 2021, there were periodic, unauthorized alterations of our Bash Uploader script by a third party, which enabled them to potentially export information stored in our users’ continuous integration (CI) environments. This information was then sent to a third-party server outside of Codecov’s infrastructure,”

Because the script is allowed to search through users’ code it potentially has access to any credentials stored with that code. This could have given the attackers access to systems inside CodeCov’s clients’ networks, and in turn, the code that those companies are developing and supplying to others. And because it is expected to upload data outside of the clients’ networks, the upload script also offered an easy exfiltration route for the stolen data.

According to Reuters, the CodeCov attackers rapidly copied and pasted credentials from compromised customers, via an automated script, and used an automated way of searching for other resources (it’s not clear if these are references to the bash upload script, which seems to fit that description, or some other tools). “The hackers put extra effort into using CodeCov to get inside other makers of software development programs, as well as companies that themselves provide many customers with technology services, including IBM,” Reuters also revealed in an interview with one of the investigators.

Reuters reports that IBM, Atlassian, and other clients of CodeCov have claimed that their code has not been altered, while not address issues on credentials. Hewlett Packard Enterprise, another CodeCov client, has yet to determine if they or any of their clients have been affected by this breach according to the news service.

CodeCov says the modified Bash Uploader could affect:

– Any credentials, tokens, or keys that our customers were passing through their [Continuous Integration] runner that would be accessible when the Bash Uploader script was executed.

– Any services, data stores, and application code that could be accessed with these credentials, tokens, or keys.

– The git remote information (URL of the origin repository) of repositories using the Bash Uploaders to upload coverage to Codecov in CI.

CodeCov has a list of recommended actions to take. This includes “all of their credentials, tokens, or keys located in the environment variables in their CI processes that used one of Codecov’s Bash Uploaders.” If you’re a CodeCov client, go here for more details. You will also find in there a list of actions they have taken in response to this breach.

The post CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack-2

CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack

CodeCov, a company that creates software auditing tools for developers, was recently breached (the company says it was breached on April 1, and reported it on the April 15). According to investigators, this incident, in turn, gave attackers access to an unknown number of CodeCov’s clients’ networks.

One cannot help but think that this knock-on breach effect is a supply-chain attack, similar to what happened to SolarWinds and their clients.

As you may recall, in the SolarWinds attack multiple companies reported being breached by state-sponsored adversaries, following an attack on the IT company SolarWinds that resulted in undetected modifications to its products. Those affected included FireEye, which resulted in the theft of their Red Team assessment tools; Microsoft; and departments in the US Treasury and Commerce.

Like SolarWinds, this seems like another attempt to add malicious code to products supplied to other organizations, so as to compromise those organizations, and potentially the software products they supply too.

CodeCov said that its Bash Uploader script, used by clients to find and upload code coverage reports to CodeCov, had been initially tampered with at the end of January this year. This wouldn’t have been found out if a client hadn’t raised concerns on April 1. According to the company, attackers were able to gain access to and alter the script by exploiting an error in CodeCov’s Docker image creation process.

A security update post by CodeCov states:

Our investigation has determined that beginning January 31, 2021, there were periodic, unauthorized alterations of our Bash Uploader script by a third party, which enabled them to potentially export information stored in our users’ continuous integration (CI) environments. This information was then sent to a third-party server outside of Codecov’s infrastructure,”

Because the script is allowed to search through users’ code it potentially has access to any credentials stored with that code. This could have given the attackers access to systems inside CodeCov’s clients’ networks, and in turn, the code that those companies are developing and supplying to others. And because it is expected to upload data outside of the clients’ networks, the upload script also offered an easy exfiltration route for the stolen data.

According to Reuters, the CodeCov attackers rapidly copied and pasted credentials from compromised customers, via an automated script, and used an automated way of searching for other resources (it’s not clear if these are references to the bash upload script, which seems to fit that description, or some other tools). “The hackers put extra effort into using CodeCov to get inside other makers of software development programs, as well as companies that themselves provide many customers with technology services, including IBM,” Reuters also revealed in an interview with one of the investigators.

Reuters reports that IBM, Atlassian, and other clients of CodeCov have claimed that their code has not been altered, while not address issues on credentials. Hewlett Packard Enterprise, another CodeCov client, has yet to determine if they or any of their clients have been affected by this breach according to the news service.

CodeCov says the modified Bash Uploader could affect:

– Any credentials, tokens, or keys that our customers were passing through their [Continuous Integration] runner that would be accessible when the Bash Uploader script was executed.

– Any services, data stores, and application code that could be accessed with these credentials, tokens, or keys.

– The git remote information (URL of the origin repository) of repositories using the Bash Uploaders to upload coverage to Codecov in CI.

CodeCov has a list of recommended actions to take. This includes “all of their credentials, tokens, or keys located in the environment variables in their CI processes that used one of Codecov’s Bash Uploaders.” If you’re a CodeCov client, go here for more details. You will also find in there a list of actions they have taken in response to this breach.

The post CodeCov supply-chain compromise likened to SolarWinds attack appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=codecov-supply-chain-compromise-likened-to-solarwinds-attack

Major BGP Leak, Codecov Attack, Lazarus APT, Discord Ransomware, & GEICO Breach – SWN #115

This week, Dr. Doug talks naughty vaccines, Air frying is not frying, BGP is leaking, Codecov, Lazarus, Google Alerts, Nitro Ransomware, & we’re joined once more for expert commentary by Jason Wood!

Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/swn for all the latest episodes!

Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/swn115

The post Major BGP Leak, Codecov Attack, Lazarus APT, Discord Ransomware, & GEICO Breach – SWN #115 appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/major-bgp-leak-codecov-attack-lazarus-apt-discord-ransomware-geico-breach-swn-115/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=major-bgp-leak-codecov-attack-lazarus-apt-discord-ransomware-geico-breach-swn-115

CVE-2021-30481: Source engine remote code execution via game invites

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The post CVE-2021-30481: Source engine remote code execution via game invites appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/cve-2021-30481-source-engine-remote-code-execution-via-game-invites-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=cve-2021-30481-source-engine-remote-code-execution-via-game-invites-2

Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple vulnerabilities in Synology DiskStation Manager

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The post Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple vulnerabilities in Synology DiskStation Manager appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/vulnerability-spotlight-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-synology-diskstation-manager-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=vulnerability-spotlight-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-synology-diskstation-manager-2

[Nextcloud] high – bypassing dashboard without account + Information disclosure trough websockets

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The post [Nextcloud] high – bypassing dashboard without account + Information disclosure trough websockets appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/nextcloud-high-bypassing-dashboard-without-account-information-disclosure-trough-websockets-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=nextcloud-high-bypassing-dashboard-without-account-information-disclosure-trough-websockets-2

[New Relic] high – Stored XSS via malicious key value of Synthetics monitor tag when visiting an Insights dashboard with filtering enabled (2123.00USD)

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The post [New Relic] high – Stored XSS via malicious key value of Synthetics monitor tag when visiting an Insights dashboard with filtering enabled (2123.00USD) appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/new-relic-high-stored-xss-via-malicious-key-value-of-synthetics-monitor-tag-when-visiting-an-insights-dashboard-with-filtering-enabled-2123-00usd-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=new-relic-high-stored-xss-via-malicious-key-value-of-synthetics-monitor-tag-when-visiting-an-insights-dashboard-with-filtering-enabled-2123-00usd-2

[Nintendo] critical – [3DS][StreetPass] Buffer Overflow in Super Mario Maker level decompression

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The post [Nintendo] critical – [3DS][StreetPass] Buffer Overflow in Super Mario Maker level decompression appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/nintendo-critical-3dsstreetpass-buffer-overflow-in-super-mario-maker-level-decompression-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=nintendo-critical-3dsstreetpass-buffer-overflow-in-super-mario-maker-level-decompression-2

Analysis of a use-after-free Vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat Reader DC

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The post Analysis of a use-after-free Vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat Reader DC appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/analysis-of-a-use-after-free-vulnerability-in-adobe-acrobat-reader-dc-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=analysis-of-a-use-after-free-vulnerability-in-adobe-acrobat-reader-dc-2

[GitLab] critical – RCE via unsafe inline Kramdown options when rendering certain Wiki pages (20000.00USD)

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The post [GitLab] critical – RCE via unsafe inline Kramdown options when rendering certain Wiki pages (20000.00USD) appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/gitlab-critical-rce-via-unsafe-inline-kramdown-options-when-rendering-certain-wiki-pages-20000-00usd-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=gitlab-critical-rce-via-unsafe-inline-kramdown-options-when-rendering-certain-wiki-pages-20000-00usd-2

Thread and Process State Change

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https://malwaredevil.com/2021/04/20/thread-and-process-state-change-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=thread-and-process-state-change-2

Barbary Pirates and Russian Cybercrime

In 1801, the United States had a small Navy. Thomas Jefferson deployed almost half that Navy—three frigates and a schooner—to the Barbary C...