Malware Devil

Friday, August 7, 2020

ESB-2020.2717 – [Appliance] Power Line Communications Bus / PLC4TRUCKS / J2497: Access confidential data – Remote/unauthenticated

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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2020.2717
        Advisory (icsa-20-219-01) Trailer Power Line Communications
                               7 August 2020

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Power Line Communications Bus / PLC4TRUCKS / J2497
Publisher:         US-CERT
Operating System:  Network Appliance
Impact/Access:     Access Confidential Data -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        None
CVE Names:         CVE-2020-14514  

Original Bulletin: 
   https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-219-01

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ICS Advisory (ICSA-20-219-01)

Trailer Power Line Communications

Original release date: August 06, 2020

Legal Notice

All information products included in https://us-cert.gov/ics are provided"as
is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained
within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in
this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by
the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information
about TLP, see https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/ .



1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  o CVSS v3 4.3
  o Vendor: Multiple Trailer and Brake Manufacturers
  o Equipment: Power Line Communications Bus / PLC4TRUCKS / J2497
  o Vulnerability: Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Sent Data

2. RISK EVALUATION

The National Motor Freight Traffic Association (NMFTA) and Assured Information
Security (AIS) have released research detailing a vulnerability within trailer
Power Line Communications (PLC) signals. Their research indicates it is
possible to read PLC signals using active antennas reliably at 6 feet and up to
8 feet away, subject to environmental conditions. The researchers expect to be
able to push this reception distance further with receiver improvements. The
impact of this issue depends heavily on what information is being sent by ECUs
on the trailer PLC bus. Typical trailer traffic is only ABS fault messages and
will thus have minimal loss of confidentiality. CISA is publishing this
advisory to bring awareness to trailer and brake manufacturers who may be
seeking to leverage PLC for sensitive information: e.g., air weigh axles or key
exchange in setting up high-speed wireless links in future tractor-trailer
interfaces.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

All trailer power line communications are affected.

3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

3.2.1 EXPOSURE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION THROUGH SENT DATA CWE-201

PLC bus traffic can be sniffed reliably via an active antenna up to 6 feet
away. Further distances are also possible, subject to environmental conditions
and receiver improvements.

CVE-2020-14514 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
4.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/
I:N/A:N ).

3.3 BACKGROUND

  o CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Transportation Systems
  o COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide

3.4 RESEARCHER

National Motor Freight Traffic Association (NMFTA) researcher Ben Gardiner,
NMFTA motor freight carriers, and Assured Information Security researchers Dan
Salloum, Chris Poore, and Eric Thayer reported this vulnerability to CISA.

4. MITIGATIONS

No current mitigations have been developed alongside this research. Future
designs can mitigate this issue by reducing radiated emissions using shorter
lengths of PLC buses and reduced transmit voltage. The goal of this advisory is
to bring awareness of the issue to the transportation systems sector.
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, users should:

  o Assess expected confidentiality of PLC traffic that is present on trailers.
       Theoretical examples to consider:
           Air weigh systems on trailer PLC could expose business intelligence
           Trailer brake controllers configured to stream values could expose
            business intelligence
           Trailer telematics systems which use PLC, while rare, could be
            exposing network information that should remain confidential

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov . Several recommended practices are available
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies .

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov in the Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies .

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to CISA for tracking
and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.

For any questions related to this report, please contact the CISA at:

Email: CISAservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by
choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this product.

- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

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maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.

NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members.  As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.

NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin.  It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made.  If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.

Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above.  If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.

Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:

        https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/

===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
                which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
                On call after hours for member emergencies only.
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