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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2020.2770
INTEL-SA-00411: Intel Thunderbolt Controller Advisory
12 August 2020
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
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Product: Intel Thunderbolt controllers
Publisher: Intel
Operating System: Windows
Linux variants
Mac OS
Impact/Access: Access Confidential Data -- Console/Physical
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2019-14630
Original Bulletin:
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00411.html
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Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00411
Advisory Category: Firmware
Impact of vulnerability : Information Disclosure
Severity rating : MEDIUM
Original release: 08/11/2020
Last revised: 08/11/2020
Summary:
A potential security vulnerability in some Intel Thunderbolt controllers may
allow information disclosure. Intel is releasing prescriptive guidance to
mitigate this potential vulnerability.
Vulnerability Details:
CVEID: CVE-2019-14630
Description: Reliance on untrusted inputs in a security decision in some Intel
(R) Thunderbolt(TM) controllers may allow unauthenticated user to potentially
enable information disclosure via physical access.
CVSS Base Score: 4.8 Medium
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Affected Products:
Thunderbolt 1: Intel DSL3310, Intel DSL3510, Intel DSL4510, Intel DSL4410.
Thunderbolt 2: Intel DSL5520, Intel DSL5320.
Thunderbolt 3: Intel DSL6540, Intel DSL6340, Intel JHL6540, Intel JHL6340,
Intel JHL6240, Intel JHL7540, Intel JHL7340.
Recommendations:
Intel recommends enabling Intel VT-d based DMA protection to mitigate this
potential vulnerability for Intel Thunderbolt 3 controllers.
For a complete Intel VT-d based DMA protection solution, Intel recommends the
following:
1. UEFI Secure Boot feature enabled.
2. Pre-boot Intel VT-d based DMA protection enabled in UEFI.
3. BIOS Setup Menu protected by password.
4. Intel VT-d based DMA Protection enabled in the OS.
5. Storage drive encryption enabled.
6. An OS or software capability to notify the user if these protections are
disabled.
For an overview of how Intel VT-d is used for Thunderbolt security, please
refer to this link:
https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2020/07/
intel-thunderbolt4-security-brief.pdf
For Windows*:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/
kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt
For other Operating Systems, refer to vendor documentation for enabling Kernel
DMA protection.
For systems that do not implement Intel VT-d based DMA protection, Intel
recommends following good security practices, including the use of only trusted
peripherals and preventing unauthorized physical access to computers.
Acknowledgements:
Intel would like to thank Theo Markettos, Colin Rothwell, Allison Pearce, Simon
W. Moore and Robert N.M. Watson from University of Cambridge, Brett F. Gutstein
from University of Cambridge/Rice University and Peter G. Neumann from SRI
International for reporting this issue.
Intel, and nearly the entire technology industry, follows a disclosure practice
called Coordinated Disclosure, under which a cybersecurity vulnerability is
generally publicly disclosed only after mitigations are available.
Revision History
Revision Date Description
1.0 08/11/2020 Initial Release
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