Malware Devil

Sunday, October 11, 2020

EdgeWorkers Use Story: Creating high-performing, individualized campaign responses in online retail

As campaigns and digital experiences become more individualized, they can create a challenge for delivering content to consumers at the highest velocity. Having each paid search, social media, and email marketing campaign add unique query string parameters to requests is critical for tracking the ROI of a company’s marketing spend. This pursuit of granular user data can place a stubborn limit on the ability of B2C companies to maximize the benefits of cached content — particularly in terms of maximizing offload of content delivery.

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Computing at the Edge

Welcome to the Akamai October 2020 Update – a week of product updates, new features, and innovations. We’ll be highlighting a different area of our portfolio each day this week. In today’s post, we look at our enhanced edge computing capabilities and how they help developers more effectively and rapidly improve customer experiences on the Akamai platform.

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You Are Here: Giving Your Users the Local Experience They Deserve

Locality matters for most things in life: weather, health care, shopping, product reviews, dinner reservations, social networking, data privacy, news, sports … the list goes on and on in our ever more connected lives. From direct user interaction on your flagship website or app to IoT device data collection and transformation, where your target audience is and where they are going is essential to providing the experience they need, want, and deserve. This experience needs to honor the privacy of the user, ensure the integrity and safe handling of personal data, and provide an accurate localized view of your key content — all while being highly performant, available, and secure.

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Analyzing MSG Files With plugin_msg_summary, (Sun, Oct 11th)

I’ve written a couple of diary entries about analyzing .MSG files (Outlook messages) with my tool oledump.py, that resulted in a dedicated plugin: plugin_msg.

Due to research I did recently, I added a new framework for plugins to oledump, and this allowed me to create a new plugin (plugin_msg_summary) that presents a summary of an email (.msg file).

I show this new plugin in this video:

Didier Stevens
Senior handler
Microsoft MVP
blog.DidierStevens.com DidierStevensLabs.com

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Read More

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DEF CON 28 Safe Mode AI Village – Younghoo Lee’s & Joshua Saxe’s ‘Detecting Social Engineering Emails With A Bleeding Edge Neural Model’

Many thanks to DEF CON and Conference Speakers for publishing their outstanding presentations; of which, originally appeared at the organization’s DEFCON 28 SAFE MODE Conference, and on the DEF CON YouTube channel. Enjoy!

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From The Archive – Robert M. Lee’s & Jeff Haas’ Little Bobby Comics – ‘WEEK 298’

via   the respected information security capabilities of  Robert M. Lee   & the superlative illustration talents of  Jeff Haas  at  Little Bobby Comics .

via the respected information security capabilities of Robert M. Lee & the superlative illustration talents of Jeff Haas at Little Bobby Comics.

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DEF CON 28 Safe Mode AI Village – ‘Workshop – Adversarial Machine Learning: Attacking AMSI Providers’

Many thanks to DEF CON and Conference Speakers for publishing their outstanding presentations; of which, originally appeared at the organization’s DEFCON 28 SAFE MODE Conference, and on the DEF CON YouTube channel. Enjoy!

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Widespread Unemployment Fraud Is Overwhelming State Systems

Back on Sept. 17, 2020, NBC News proclaimed that “fraudsters steal millions from unemployment coffers, adding to pain of those still waiting for benefits.” Here’s how that story begins: Over $1 billion in unemployment aid is being threatened by fraud, in schemes ranging from lying about personal income to sophisticated cybercrime, state and federal officials..

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Saturday, October 10, 2020

Open Packaging Conventions, (Sat, Oct 10th)

Office files like .docx, .xlsm, … are Office Open XML (OOXML) files: a ZIP container containing XML files and possibly other file types.

OOXML files follow the Open Packaging Conventions (OPC) format.

OPC files contain a /[Content_Types].xml file (describing the MIME format of all parts of the OPC container) and a _rels/.rels file (documenting the relationships inside the OPC container).

Like this .xlsm file:

In my experience with OOXML files, /[Content_Types].xml is the first ZIP record, and _rels/.rels is the second ZIP record.

When an OOXML file has been modified with a ZIP utility, it’s often the case that that order is no longer respected: files /[Content_Types].xml  and _rels/.rels  are no longer first and second (this has no impact on the parsing of these altered files by Office applications).

AFAIK, the OPC standard does not require these 2 files to be the first in the ZIP container.

Please post a comment if you know of OPC examples (there are other file formats than OOXML that are based on OPC) created by applications that do not put these 2 files first inside the ZIP container.

 

Didier Stevens
Senior handler
Microsoft MVP
blog.DidierStevens.com DidierStevensLabs.com

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Read More

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DEF CON 28 Safe Mode AI Village – Vahid Behdazan’s ‘Security Challenges In Deep Reinforcement Learning’

Many thanks to DEF CON and Conference Speakers for publishing their outstanding presentations; of which, originally appeared at the organization’s DEFCON 28 SAFE MODE Conference, and on the DEF CON YouTube channel. Enjoy!

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The post DEF CON 28 Safe Mode AI Village – Vahid Behdazan’s ‘Security Challenges In Deep Reinforcement Learning’ appeared first on Security Boulevard.

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Report: U.S. Cyber Command Behind Trickbot Tricks — Krebs on Security

Four U.S. officials who spoke on condition of anonymity said the Trickbot disruption was the work of U.S. Cyber Command, a branch of the Department of Defense headed by the director of the NSA.
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Report: U.S. Cyber Command Behind Trickbot Tricks

A week ago, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that someone was attempting to disrupt the Trickbot botnet, a malware crime machine that has infected millions of computers and is often used to spread ransomware. A new report Friday says the coordinated attack was part of an operation carried out by the U.S. military’s Cyber Command.

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Report: U.S. Cyber Command Behind Trickbot Tricks

A week ago, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that someone was attempting to disrupt the Trickbot botnet, a malware crime machine that has infected millions of computers and is often used to spread ransomware. A new report Friday says the coordinated attack was part of an operation carried out by the U.S. military’s Cyber Command.

Image: Shuttstock.

On October 2, KrebsOnSecurity reported that twice in the preceding ten days, an unknown entity that had inside access to the Trickbot botnet sent all infected systems a command telling them to disconnect themselves from the Internet servers the Trickbot overlords used to control compromised Microsoft Windows computers.

On top of that, someone had stuffed millions of bogus records about new victims into the Trickbot database — apparently to confuse or stymie the botnet’s operators.

In a story published Oct. 9, The Washington Post reported that four U.S. officials who spoke on condition of anonymity said the Trickbot disruption was the work of U.S. Cyber Command, a branch of the Department of Defense headed by the director of the National Security Agency (NSA).

The Post report suggested the action was a bid to prevent Trickbot from being used to somehow interfere with the upcoming presidential election, noting that Cyber Command was instrumental in disrupting the Internet access of Russian online troll farms during the 2018 midterm elections.

The Post said U.S. officials recognized their operation would not permanently dismantle Trickbot, describing it rather as “one way to distract them for at least a while as they seek to restore their operations.”

Alex Holden, chief information security officer and president of Milwaukee-based Hold Security, has been monitoring Trickbot activity before and after the 10-day operation. Holden said while the attack on Trickbot appears to have cut its operators off from a large number of victim computers, the bad guys still have passwords, financial data and reams of other sensitive information stolen from more than 2.7 million systems around the world.

Holden said the Trickbot operators have begun rebuilding their botnet, and continue to engage in deploying ransomware at new targets.

“They are running normally and their ransomware operations are pretty much back in full swing,” Holden said. “The are not slowing down because they still have a great deal of stolen data.”

Holden added that since news of the disruption first broke a week ago, the Russian-speaking cybercriminals behind Trickbot have been discussing how to recoup their losses, and have been toying with the idea of massively increasing the amount of money demanded from future ransomware victims.

“There is a conversation happening in the back channels,” Holden said. “Normally, they will ask for [a ransom amount] that is something like 10 percent of the victim company’s annual revenues. Now, some of the guys involved are talking about increasing that to 100 percent or 150 percent.”

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Fitbit Spyware Steals Personal Data via Watch Face

A wide-open app-building API would allow an attacker to build a malicious application that could access Fitbit user data, and send it to any server.
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Chrome changes how its cache system works to improve privacy

Known as the HTTP Cache or the Shared Cache, this Chrome component works by saving copies of resources loaded on a web page, such as images, CSS files, and JavaScript files.
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Friday, October 9, 2020

Analíticas: La importancia de medir su trabajo

Las analíticas, la interpretación de los datos y el uso de estos para la generación de estrategias, son elementos fundamentales para las empresas en la actualidad. Se calcula que las analíticas y la inteligencia artificial generarán más de 9,5 billones

The post Analíticas: La importancia de medir su trabajo appeared first on ManageEngine Blog.

The post Analíticas: La importancia de medir su trabajo appeared first on Security Boulevard.

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Enhancing Security Workflows in Palo Alto Networks Cortex XSOAR with Layer 7 Indicators

To protect applications as modern development processes evolve and accelerate, businesses need to integrate security as part of the DevOps and security toolchain. This is a primary driver behind why we built Signal Sciences web application and API protection platform…

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Detect and Mitigate Critical Intel Vulnerabilities (INTEL-SA-00241, INTEL-SA-00404)

Enterprise devices include a variety of components that are critical to the security posture of the device. Components used for out-of-band management and Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) used to protect cryptographic keys on  the device are just a few examples. Vulnerabilities in these components can pose considerable risk to a device. For example, an attacker […]

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AA20-283A: APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations

Original release date: October 9, 2020

Summary

This joint cybersecurity advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise framework for all referenced threat actor techniques.

Note: the analysis in this joint cybersecurity advisory is ongoing, and the information provided should not be considered comprehensive. The Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency (CISA) will update this advisory as new information is available.

This joint cybersecurity advisory was written by CISA with contributions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

CISA has recently observed advanced persistent threat (APT) actors exploiting multiple legacy vulnerabilities in combination with a newer privilege escalation vulnerability—CVE-2020-1472—in Windows Netlogon. The commonly used tactic, known as vulnerability chaining, exploits multiple vulnerabilities in the course of a single intrusion to compromise a network or application. 

This recent malicious activity has often, but not exclusively, been directed at federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government networks. Although it does not appear these targets are being selected because of their proximity to elections information, there may be some risk to elections information housed on government networks.

CISA is aware of some instances where this activity resulted in unauthorized access to elections support systems; however, CISA has no evidence to date that integrity of elections data has been compromised. There are steps that election officials, their supporting SLTT IT staff, and vendors can take to help defend against this malicious cyber activity.

Some common tactics, techniques, and procedures used by APT actors include leveraging legacy network access and virtual private network (VPN) vulnerabilities in association with the recent critical CVE-2020-1472 Netlogon vulnerability. CISA is aware of multiple cases where the Fortinet FortiOS Secure Socket Layer (SSL) VPN vulnerability CVE-2018-13379 has been exploited to gain access to networks. To a lesser extent, CISA has also observed threat actors exploiting the MobileIron vulnerability CVE-2020-15505. While these exploits have been observed recently, this activity is ongoing and still unfolding. CISA recommends network staff and administrators review internet-facing infrastructure for vulnerabilities, including Juniper CVE-2020-1631, Pulse Secure CVE-2019-11510,  Citrix NetScaler CVE-2020-19781, and Palo Alto Networks CVE-2020-2012 (this list is not considered exhaustive).

After gaining initial access, the actors exploit CVE-2020-1472 to compromise all Active Directory (AD) identity services. Actors have then been observed using legitimate remote access tools, such as VPN and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), to access the environment with the compromised credentials. Observed activity targets multiple sectors, and is not limited to SLTT entities.

Click here for a PDF version of this report.

Technical Details

Initial Access

APT threat actors are actively leveraging legacy vulnerabilities in internet-facing infrastructure (Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190], External Remote Services [T1133]) to gain initial access into systems. The APT actors appear to have predominately gained initial access via the Fortinet FortiOS VPN vulnerability CVE-2018-13379; however, other vulnerabilities, listed below, have been observed (as analysis is evolving, these listed vulnerabilities should not be considered comprehensive).

  • Citrix NetScaler CVE-2020-19781
  • MobileIron CVE-2020-15505
  • Pulse Secure CVE-2019-11510
  • Palo Alto Networks CVE-2020-2012
  • F5 BIG-IP CVE-2020-5902

FortiGuard ForitOS SSL VPN CVE-2018-13379

CVE-2018-13379 is a path traversal vulnerability in the FortiOS SSL VPN web portal. An unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to download FortiOS system files through specially crafted HTTP resource requests.

MobileIron Core & Connector Vulnerability CVE-2020-15505

CVE-202-15505 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3 and earlier. This vulnerability allows an external attacker, with no privileges, to execute code of their choice on the vulnerable system. As mobile device management (MDM) systems are critical to configuration management for external devices, they are usually highly permissioned and make a valuable target for threat actors.

Privilege Escalation

Post initial access, the APT actors use multiple techniques to expand access to the environment. The actors are leveraging CVE-2020-1472 in Windows Netlogon to escalate privileges and obtain access to Windows AD servers. Actors are also leveraging the opensource tools such as Mimikatz and the CrackMapExec tool to obtain Valid Account [T1078] credentials from AD servers.

Microsoft Netlogon Remote Protocol Vulnerability: CVE-2020-1472

CVE-2020-1472 is a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), a core authentication component of Active Directory. This vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a domain controller to completely compromise all AD identity services (Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts [T1078.002]). Malicious actors can leverage this vulnerability to compromise other devices on the network (Lateral Movement [TA0008]).

Persistence

Once system access has been achieved, the APT actors use abuse of legitimate credentials (Valid Account [T1078]) to log in via VPN or Remote Access Services [T1133] to maintain persistence.

Mitigations

Organizations with externally facing infrastructure devices that have the vulnerabilities listed in this joint cybersecurity advisory, or other vulnerabilities, should move forward with an “assume breach” mentality. As initial exploitation and escalation may be the only observable exploitation activity, most mitigations will need to focus on more traditional network hygiene and user management activities.

Keep Systems Up to Date

Patch systems and equipment promptly and diligently. Establishing and consistently maintaining a thorough patching cycle continues to be the best defense against adversary TTPs. See table 1 for patch information on CVEs mentioned in this report.

Table 1: Patch information for exploited CVEs

Vulnerability Vulnerable Products Patch Information
CVE-2018-13379
  • FortiOS 6.0
  • FortiOS 5.6  
  • FortiOS 5.4
CVE-2019-19781
  • Citrix Application Delivery Controller
  • Citrix Gateway
  • Citrix SDWAN WANOP
CVE-2020-5902
  • Big-IP devices (LTM, AAM, Advanced WAF, AFM, Analytics, APM, ASM, DDHD, DNS, FPS, GTM, Link Controller, PEM, SSLO, CGNAT)
CVE-2020-11510
  • Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 – 9.0R3.3, 8.3R1 – 8.3R7, 8.2R1 – 8.2R12, 8.1R1 – 8.1R15
  • Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 – 9.0R3.1, 5.4R1 – 5.4R7, 5.3R1 – 5.3R12, 5.2R1 – 5.2R12, 5.1R1 – 5.1R15
CVE-2020-15505
  • MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3.0.3 and earlier, 10.4.0.0, 10.4.0.1, 10.4.0.2, 10.4.0.3, 10.5.1.0, 10.5.2.0 and 10.6.0.0  
  • Sentry versions 9.7.2 and earlier, and 9.8.0;  
  • Monitor and Reporting Database (RDB) version 2.0.0.1 and earlier
CVE-2020-1631
  • Junos OS 12.3, 12.3X48, 14.1X53, 15.1, 15.1X49, 15.1X53, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4, 18.1, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4, 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, 20.1
CVE-2020-2021
  • PAN-OS 9.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.1.3; PAN-OS 9.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.0.9; PAN-OS 8.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 8.1.15, and all versions of PAN-OS 8.0 (EOL)
CVE-2020-1472
  • Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1
  • Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)
  • Windows Server 2012
  • Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation)
  • Windows Server 2012 R2
  • Windows Server 2016
  • Windows Server 2019
  • Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation)
  • Windows Server, version 1903  (Server Core installation)
  • Windows Server, version 1909  (Server Core installation)
  • Windows Server, version 2004   (Server Core installation)

Comprehensive Account Resets

If there is an observation of CVE-2020-1472 Netlogon activity or other indications of valid credential abuse detected, it should be assumed the APT actors have compromised AD administrative accounts, the AD forest should not be fully trusted, and, therefore, a new forest should be deployed. Existing hosts from the old compromised forest cannot be migrated in without being rebuilt and rejoined to the new domain, but migration may be done through “creative destruction,” wherein as endpoints in the legacy forest are decommissioned, new ones can be built in the new forest. This will need to be completed on on-premise as well as Azure hosted AD instances.

Note that fully resetting an AD forest is difficult and complex; it is best done with the assistance of personnel who have successfully completed the task previously.

It is critical to perform a full password reset on all user and computer accounts in the AD forest. Use the following steps as a guide.

  1. Create a temporary administrator account, and use this account only for all administrative actions
  2. Reset the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (krbtgt) password; this must be completed before any additional actions and a second reset will take place in step 5
  3. Wait for the krbtgt reset to propagate to all domain controllers (time may vary)
  4. Reset all account passwords (passwords should be 15 characters or more and randomly assigned):
    1. User accounts (forced reset with no legacy password reuse)
    2. Local accounts on hosts (including local accounts not covered by Local Administrator Password Solution [LAPS])
    3. Service accounts
    4. Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) account
    5. Domain Controller machine account
    6. Application passwords
  5. Reset the krbtgt password again
  6. Wait for the krbtgt reset to propagate to all domain controllers (time may vary)
  7. Reboot domain controllers
  8. Reboot all endpoints

The following accounts should be reset:

  • AD Kerberos Authentication Master (2x)
  • All Active Directory Accounts
  • All Active Directory Admin Accounts
  • All Active Directory Service Accounts
  • All Active Directory User Accounts
  • DSRM Account on Domain Controllers
  • Non-AD Privileged Application Accounts
  • Non-AD Unprivileged Application Accounts
  • Non-Windows Privileged Accounts
  • Non-Windows User Accounts
  • Windows Computer Accounts
  • Windows Local Admin

VPN Vulnerabilities

Implement the following recommendations to secure your organization’s VPNs:

  • Update VPNs, network infrastructure devices, and devices being used to remote into work environments with the latest software patches and security configurations. See CISA Tips Understanding Patches and Securing Network Infrastructure Devices. Wherever possible, enable automatic updates. See table 1 for patch information on VPN-related CVEs mentioned in this report.
  • Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) on all VPN connections to increase security. Physical security tokens are the most secure form of MFA, followed by authenticator app-based MFA. SMS and email-based MFA should only be used when no other forms are available. If MFA is not implemented, require teleworkers to use strong passwords. See CISA Tips Choosing and Protecting Passwords and Supplementing Passwords for more information.

Discontinue unused VPN servers. Reduce your organization’s attack surface by discontinuing unused VPN servers, which may act as a point of entry for attackers. How to protect your organization against VPN vulnerabilities:

  • Audit configuration and patch management programs.
  • Monitor network traffic for unexpected and unapproved protocols, especially outbound to the internet (e.g., SSH, SMB, RDP).
  • Implement MFA, especially for privileged accounts.
  • Use separate administrative accounts on separate administration workstations.
  • Keep software up to date. Enable automatic updates, if available.  

To secure your organization’s Netlogon channel connections:

  • Update all Domain Controllers and Read Only Domain Controllers. On August 11, 2020, Microsoft released software updates to mitigate CVE-2020-1472. Applying this update to domain controllers is currently the only mitigation to this vulnerability (aside from removing affected domain controllers from the network).
  • Monitor for new events, and address non-compliant devices that are using vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections.
  • Block public access to potentially vulnerable ports, such as 445 (SMB) and 135 (RPC).

To protect your organization against this CVE, follow advice from Microsoft, including:

  • Update your domain controllers with an update released August 11, 2020 or later.
  • Find which devices are making vulnerable connections by monitoring event logs.
  • Address non-compliant devices making vulnerable connections.
  • Enable enforcement mode to address CVE-2020-1472 in your environment.

How to uncover and mitigate malicious activity

  • Collect and remove for further analysis:
    • Relevant artifacts, logs, and data
  • Implement mitigation steps that avoid tipping off the adversary that their presence in the network has been discovered.
  • Consider soliciting incident response support from a third-party IT security organization to:
    • Provide subject matter expertise and technical support to the incident response,
    • Ensure that the actor is eradicated from the network, and
    • Avoid residual issues that could result in follow-up compromises once the incident is closed

Resources

Contact Information

Recipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat.

For any questions related to this report or to report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, please contact:

 
DISCLAIMER
 
This information is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The United States Government does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information. In no event shall the United States Government or its contractors or subcontractors be liable for any damages, including but not limited to, direct, indirect, special or consequential damages, arising out of, resulting from, or in any way connected with this information, whether or not based upon warranty, contract, tort, or otherwise, whether or not arising out of negligence, and whether or not injury was sustained from, or arose out of the results of, or reliance upon the information.

The United States Government does not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply their endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government.

 

Revisions

  • October 9, 2020: Initial Version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Read More

The post AA20-283A: APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2020/10/09/aa20-283a-apt-actors-chaining-vulnerabilities-against-sltt-critical-infrastructure-and-elections-organizations-2/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=aa20-283a-apt-actors-chaining-vulnerabilities-against-sltt-critical-infrastructure-and-elections-organizations-2

AA20-283A: APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations

Original release date: October 9, 2020SummaryThis joint cybersecurity advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise framework for all referenced threat actor techniques.

Note: the analysis in this joint cybersecurity advisory is ongoing, and the information provided should not be considered comprehensive. The Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency (CISA) will update this advisory as new information is available.

This joint cybersecurity advisory was written by CISA with contributions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

CISA has recently observed advanced persistent threat (APT) actors exploiting multiple legacy vulnerabilities in combination with a newer privilege escalation vulnerability—CVE-2020-1472—in Windows Netlogon. The commonly used tactic, known as vulnerability chaining, exploits multiple vulnerabilities in the course of a single intrusion to compromise a network or application. 

This recent malicious activity has often, but not exclusively, been directed at federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government networks. Although it does not appear these targets are being selected because of their proximity to elections information, there may be some risk to elections information housed on government networks.

CISA is aware of some instances where this activity resulted in unauthorized access to elections support systems; however, CISA has no evidence to date that integrity of elections data has been compromised. There are steps that election officials, their supporting SLTT IT staff, and vendors can take to help defend against this malicious cyber activity.

Some common tactics, techniques, and procedures used by APT actors include leveraging legacy network access and virtual private network (VPN) vulnerabilities in association with the recent critical CVE-2020-1472 Netlogon vulnerability. CISA is aware of multiple cases where the Fortinet FortiOS Secure Socket Layer (SSL) VPN vulnerability CVE-2018-13379 has been exploited to gain access to networks. To a lesser extent, CISA has also observed threat actors exploiting the MobileIron vulnerability CVE-2020-15505. While these exploits have been observed recently, this activity is ongoing and still unfolding. CISA recommends network staff and administrators review internet-facing infrastructure for vulnerabilities, including Juniper CVE-2020-1631, Pulse Secure CVE-2019-11510,  Citrix NetScaler CVE-2020-19781, and Palo Alto Networks CVE-2020-2012 (this list is not considered exhaustive).

After gaining initial access, the actors exploit CVE-2020-1472 to compromise all Active Directory (AD) identity services. Actors have then been observed using legitimate remote access tools, such as VPN and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), to access the environment with the compromised credentials. Observed activity targets multiple sectors, and is not limited to SLTT entities.

Click here for a PDF version of this report.
Technical DetailsInitial Access

APT threat actors are actively leveraging legacy vulnerabilities in internet-facing infrastructure (Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190], External Remote Services [T1133]) to gain initial access into systems. The APT actors appear to have predominately gained initial access via the Fortinet FortiOS VPN vulnerability CVE-2018-13379; however, other vulnerabilities, listed below, have been observed (as analysis is evolving, these listed vulnerabilities should not be considered comprehensive).

Citrix NetScaler CVE-2020-19781
MobileIron CVE-2020-15505
Pulse Secure CVE-2019-11510
Palo Alto Networks CVE-2020-2012
F5 BIG-IP CVE-2020-5902

FortiGuard ForitOS SSL VPN CVE-2018-13379

CVE-2018-13379 is a path traversal vulnerability in the FortiOS SSL VPN web portal. An unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to download FortiOS system files through specially crafted HTTP resource requests.

MobileIron Core & Connector Vulnerability CVE-2020-15505

CVE-202-15505 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3 and earlier. This vulnerability allows an external attacker, with no privileges, to execute code of their choice on the vulnerable system. As mobile device management (MDM) systems are critical to configuration management for external devices, they are usually highly permissioned and make a valuable target for threat actors.

Privilege Escalation

Post initial access, the APT actors use multiple techniques to expand access to the environment. The actors are leveraging CVE-2020-1472 in Windows Netlogon to escalate privileges and obtain access to Windows AD servers. Actors are also leveraging the opensource tools such as Mimikatz and the CrackMapExec tool to obtain Valid Account [T1078] credentials from AD servers.

Microsoft Netlogon Remote Protocol Vulnerability: CVE-2020-1472

CVE-2020-1472 is a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), a core authentication component of Active Directory. This vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a domain controller to completely compromise all AD identity services (Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts [T1078.002]). Malicious actors can leverage this vulnerability to compromise other devices on the network (Lateral Movement [TA0008]).

Persistence

Once system access has been achieved, the APT actors use abuse of legitimate credentials (Valid Account [T1078]) to log in via VPN or Remote Access Services [T1133] to maintain persistence.
MitigationsOrganizations with externally facing infrastructure devices that have the vulnerabilities listed in this joint cybersecurity advisory, or other vulnerabilities, should move forward with an “assume breach” mentality. As initial exploitation and escalation may be the only observable exploitation activity, most mitigations will need to focus on more traditional network hygiene and user management activities.

Keep Systems Up to Date

Patch systems and equipment promptly and diligently. Establishing and consistently maintaining a thorough patching cycle continues to be the best defense against adversary TTPs. See table 1 for patch information on CVEs mentioned in this report.

Table 1: Patch information for exploited CVEs

Vulnerability
Vulnerable Products
Patch Information

CVE-2018-13379

FortiOS 6.0
FortiOS 5.6  
FortiOS 5.4

Fortiguard Security Advisory: FG-IR-18-384

CVE-2019-19781

Citrix Application Delivery Controller
Citrix Gateway
Citrix SDWAN WANOP

Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 11.1 and 12.0  
Citrix blog post: security updates for Citrix SD-WAN WANOP release 10.2.6 and 11.0.3
Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 12.1 and 13.0
Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway version 10.5

CVE-2020-5902

Big-IP devices (LTM, AAM, Advanced WAF, AFM, Analytics, APM, ASM, DDHD, DNS, FPS, GTM, Link Controller, PEM, SSLO, CGNAT)

F5 Security Advisory: K52145254: TMUI RCE vulnerability CVE-2020-5902

CVE-2020-11510

Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 – 9.0R3.3, 8.3R1 – 8.3R7, 8.2R1 – 8.2R12, 8.1R1 – 8.1R15
Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 – 9.0R3.1, 5.4R1 – 5.4R7, 5.3R1 – 5.3R12, 5.2R1 – 5.2R12, 5.1R1 – 5.1R15

Pulse Secure Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX

CVE-2020-15505

MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3.0.3 and earlier, 10.4.0.0, 10.4.0.1, 10.4.0.2, 10.4.0.3, 10.5.1.0, 10.5.2.0 and 10.6.0.0  
Sentry versions 9.7.2 and earlier, and 9.8.0;  
Monitor and Reporting Database (RDB) version 2.0.0.1 and earlier

Mobile Iron Blog: MobileIron Security Updates Available

CVE-2020-1631

Junos OS 12.3, 12.3X48, 14.1X53, 15.1, 15.1X49, 15.1X53, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4, 18.1, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4, 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, 20.1

Juniper Security Advisory JSA11021

CVE-2020-2021

PAN-OS 9.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.1.3; PAN-OS 9.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.0.9; PAN-OS 8.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 8.1.15, and all versions of PAN-OS 8.0 (EOL)

Palo Alto Networks Security Advisory for CVE-2020-2021

CVE-2020-1472

Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1
Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)
Windows Server 2012
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation)
Windows Server 2012 R2
Windows Server 2016
Windows Server 2019
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation)
Windows Server, version 1903  (Server Core installation)
Windows Server, version 1909  (Server Core installation)
Windows Server, version 2004   (Server Core installation)

Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2020-1472

Comprehensive Account Resets

If there is an observation of CVE-2020-1472 Netlogon activity or other indications of valid credential abuse detected, it should be assumed the APT actors have compromised AD administrative accounts, the AD forest should not be fully trusted, and, therefore, a new forest should be deployed. Existing hosts from the old compromised forest cannot be migrated in without being rebuilt and rejoined to the new domain, but migration may be done through “creative destruction,” wherein as endpoints in the legacy forest are decommissioned, new ones can be built in the new forest. This will need to be completed on on-premise as well as Azure hosted AD instances.

Note that fully resetting an AD forest is difficult and complex; it is best done with the assistance of personnel who have successfully completed the task previously.

It is critical to perform a full password reset on all user and computer accounts in the AD forest. Use the following steps as a guide.

Create a temporary administrator account, and use this account only for all administrative actions
Reset the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (krbtgt) password; this must be completed before any additional actions and a second reset will take place in step 5
Wait for the krbtgt reset to propagate to all domain controllers (time may vary)
Reset all account passwords (passwords should be 15 characters or more and randomly assigned):

User accounts (forced reset with no legacy password reuse)
Local accounts on hosts (including local accounts not covered by Local Administrator Password Solution [LAPS])
Service accounts
Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) account
Domain Controller machine account
Application passwords

Reset the krbtgt password again
Wait for the krbtgt reset to propagate to all domain controllers (time may vary)
Reboot domain controllers
Reboot all endpoints

The following accounts should be reset:

AD Kerberos Authentication Master (2x)
All Active Directory Accounts
All Active Directory Admin Accounts
All Active Directory Service Accounts
All Active Directory User Accounts
DSRM Account on Domain Controllers
Non-AD Privileged Application Accounts
Non-AD Unprivileged Application Accounts
Non-Windows Privileged Accounts
Non-Windows User Accounts
Windows Computer Accounts
Windows Local Admin

VPN Vulnerabilities

Implement the following recommendations to secure your organization’s VPNs:

Update VPNs, network infrastructure devices, and devices being used to remote into work environments with the latest software patches and security configurations. See CISA Tips Understanding Patches and Securing Network Infrastructure Devices. Wherever possible, enable automatic updates. See table 1 for patch information on VPN-related CVEs mentioned in this report.
Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) on all VPN connections to increase security. Physical security tokens are the most secure form of MFA, followed by authenticator app-based MFA. SMS and email-based MFA should only be used when no other forms are available. If MFA is not implemented, require teleworkers to use strong passwords. See CISA Tips Choosing and Protecting Passwords and Supplementing Passwords for more information.

Discontinue unused VPN servers. Reduce your organization’s attack surface by discontinuing unused VPN servers, which may act as a point of entry for attackers. How to protect your organization against VPN vulnerabilities:

Audit configuration and patch management programs.
Monitor network traffic for unexpected and unapproved protocols, especially outbound to the internet (e.g., SSH, SMB, RDP).
Implement MFA, especially for privileged accounts.
Use separate administrative accounts on separate administration workstations.
Keep software up to date. Enable automatic updates, if available.  

To secure your organization’s Netlogon channel connections:

Update all Domain Controllers and Read Only Domain Controllers. On August 11, 2020, Microsoft released software updates to mitigate CVE-2020-1472. Applying this update to domain controllers is currently the only mitigation to this vulnerability (aside from removing affected domain controllers from the network).
Monitor for new events, and address non-compliant devices that are using vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections.
Block public access to potentially vulnerable ports, such as 445 (SMB) and 135 (RPC).

To protect your organization against this CVE, follow advice from Microsoft, including:

Update your domain controllers with an update released August 11, 2020 or later.
Find which devices are making vulnerable connections by monitoring event logs.
Address non-compliant devices making vulnerable connections.
Enable enforcement mode to address CVE-2020-1472 in your environment.

How to uncover and mitigate malicious activity

Collect and remove for further analysis:

Relevant artifacts, logs, and data

Implement mitigation steps that avoid tipping off the adversary that their presence in the network has been discovered.
Consider soliciting incident response support from a third-party IT security organization to:

Provide subject matter expertise and technical support to the incident response,
Ensure that the actor is eradicated from the network, and
Avoid residual issues that could result in follow-up compromises once the incident is closed

Resources

CISA VPN-Related Guidance
CISA Infographic: Risk Vulnerability And Assessment (RVA) Mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK
National Security Agency InfoSheet: Configuring IPsec Virtual Private Networks
CISA Joint Advisory: AA20-245A: Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity
CISA Activity Alert: AA20-073A: Enterprise VPN Security
CISA Activity Alert: AA20-031A: Detecting Citrix CVE-2019-19781
CISA Activity Alert: AA20-010A: Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability
Cybersecurity Alerts and Advisories: Subscriptions to CISA Alerts and MS-ISAC Advisories

Contact InformationRecipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat.

For any questions related to this report or to report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, please contact:

CISA (888-282-0870 or Central@cisa.dhs.gov), or
The FBI through the FBI Cyber Division (855-292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov) or a local field office

 

DISCLAIMER

 

This information is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The United States Government does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information. In no event shall the United States Government or its contractors or subcontractors be liable for any damages, including but not limited to, direct, indirect, special or consequential damages, arising out of, resulting from, or in any way connected with this information, whether or not based upon warranty, contract, tort, or otherwise, whether or not arising out of negligence, and whether or not injury was sustained from, or arose out of the results of, or reliance upon the information.

The United States Government does not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply their endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government.

 

Revisions
October 9, 2020: Initial Version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Read More

The post AA20-283A: APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations appeared first on Malware Devil.



https://malwaredevil.com/2020/10/09/aa20-283a-apt-actors-chaining-vulnerabilities-against-sltt-critical-infrastructure-and-elections-organizations/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=aa20-283a-apt-actors-chaining-vulnerabilities-against-sltt-critical-infrastructure-and-elections-organizations

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